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A
DISCOURSE
OF THE
Several Dignities,
AND
CORRUPTIONS,
OF
MAN'S NATURE,
SINCE THE
F A L L.

Written by the Ever Memorable
Mr. JOHN HALES of Eton.

Now first Publish'd from his Original Manuscript.

L O N D O N :

Printed for E. CURLL, next the Temple Coffee
House in Fleet-street. M.DCC.XX. [Price 3 s.]




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THE
EDITOR'S
PREFACE

 *HE general Suspicion under which all Posthumous Pieces labour, of being thought spurious, obliges me to give the Publick a particular Account of this Work. Being informed by the Reverend Mr. Iux, Chaplain to the late Lord Bishop of Bristol, that a Friend of his was possessed of a very valuable Manuscript written by the learned Mr. HALES of Eton, and that he had been so kind to recommend me to his Friend for the printing of it, according to his Desire, I wrote to the Gentleman about*

it, from whom I received, with the Manuscript, the following Letters, which, I think, sufficiently prove the Genuineness of it beyond Dispute.

For Mr. Curll, Bookseller, at his House
in Fleetstreet, London.

SIR,

I Received yours on Monday, and in answer to your Queries, I send you the following Account.

The Title of Mr. Hales's Treatise is,
*A Discourse of the several Dignities, and
Corruptions of Man's Nature, since the
Fall.*

As to the Genuineness of the Book, be pleased to know, that Mr. Hales, in the hard Times of Usurpation, was content to become a Tutor to a Lady's Son in Buckinghamshire; from whence, after about a Years stay, retiring elsewhere, and dying soon after, it was preserved amongst the Papers of the said Lady, who was my Relation. This Manuscript was writ over by a very ignorant

norant Amanuensis, and full of false
 Spellings, but corrected by Mr. *Hales*
 himself, with his own Hand, in several
 Places, where the Mistakes were most
 material. It bore Mr. *Hales's* Name in
 the Title Page, in his own Hand;
 which indeed was the Reason why I
 transcribed it, nothing doubting of the
 Genuineness of it; for otherwise I
 should not have taken the Pains to have
 writ it over my self, as I did. But be-
 cause the Original was so very deficient
 in its Orthography, and I having, when
 I transcribed it, no design of printing
 it, I thought it not worth the preserving
 after it had given me so much trouble.
 Had it been in Mr. *Hales's* own Hand,
 which was very plain and legible, my
 Pains might have been spared; but
 the Matter falling out otherwise, I took
 care to correct all the false Spellings,
 as you will find when you see the Book
 it self. Some ingenious Gentlemen
 that have perused it, make no questi-
 on at all of Mr. *Hales's* being the Au-
 thor of it, being a very well writ Trea-
 tise. This is all the Account I am able
 to give you of it. If you desire to see
 it,

it, I will send it up to you, either by Coach or Carrier, as you shall think best, some Time this Week, if I hear from you Time enough to do it.

Sir,

Ch. Ch. Oxon.
Apr. 27th.

I am,

Your Humble Servant, &c.

Accordingly I desired the Gentleman to send me the Manuscript, which I received with the following Letter.

SIR,

According to my Promise, I have sent you Mr. Hales's Book. Your Judgment is right, in thinking it might be something Philosophical, the Nature of the Subject requiring it; yet it is nothing at all, as far as I can perceive, abstruse or obscure, especially to any Gentleman that has been but moderately acquainted with University Learning, or relishes Treatises of this kind. Some few Expressions there are that betray the Time they were writ

in (our Language not being then so refined, as it was after the Return of King CHARLES the Second) which I thought fit rather to let alone, than alter, both out of Respect to Mr. *Hales*, and my own Insufficiency to correct any Thing that bore his Name. Besides too, it might have rendered the Author less Genuine in the Eyes of some Gentlemen, who are Judges of Stiles, and would rather have him as he is, in his own natural Colours, than in a new, though more modish Dress.

I see no need of a Preface (which sometimes makes the Portal bigger than the House) any farther than just to give a short Account of the Genuineness of the Book, concerning which, all that I can say, I sent to you in my former Letter. Mr. *Hales*'s Memory is still fresh in the Minds of many; but they who desire to be fully satisfied concerning him, may consult *Wood's Athenæ*, &c. where he is described at large.

I have only this to add, that if you think fit to have any Thing said by the Publisher to the Reader, my Name may not be mentioned in it; for I abhor being in Print, as much as some others desire it.

I am,

Ch. Ch. Oxon,

Apr. 30, 1719.

Sir,

Your Humble Servant, &c.

Thus far as is proper to the Authentickness of the following Sheets.

It may seem superfluous, after so many learned Men have spoken in Praise of Mr. HALES, to add to his Character; but every one into whose Hands this Posthumous Treatise shall fall, may not perhaps have an Opportunity of seeing or knowing any Part of his Life; and therefore I think it not only a Justice due to the Memory of that Great Man, but a decent Civility to the Reader, to give a short Account of him.

Mr.

Mr. Anthony à Wood in his *Athenæ Oxonienses* says thus,

JOHN HALES, one of the most judicious and learned Divines of the Church of *England*, was in such great Esteem, that his Name is seldom mentioned without the Epithet of *Ever Memorable*. He was the younger Son of *John Hales* (Steward to the Family of the *Horners* in *Somersetshire*) born in the Year 1584, in the City of *Bath*, and educated there in Grammar Learning. At Thirteen Years of Age he was admitted in the University of *Oxford*, and was for some Time a Scholar of *Corpus Christi College*; where he so distinguished himself, that Sir HENRY SAVILE (that worthy Patron of Learning and learned Men) in the Year 1605. removed him to *Merton College*, where at the next Election he was chosen Fellow, at which, and in other Stations and Conditions he exceeded all Competitors. In 1618, he was Chaplain to Sir DUDLEY CARLTON, Ambassador to the *United Provinces*, and was present at the Synod of

Dort. At his Return to *England* he was made Fellow of *Eton College*. He had been some Time Greek Professor of the University of *Oxford*, and at last was Prebendary of *Windsor*. He was a great Sufferer by the Iniquity of the Rebellion, especially in the latter Part of his Life, dying in great Want on the 9th Day of May, in the Year 1656, having lived to the Age of Seventy Two Years, and was buried in *Eton College Church Yard*, according to his own Desire. Over his Grave, afterwards, was an Altar Monument erected with the following Inscription.

Musarum & Charitum Amo
JOHANNES HALESIUS
(Nomen non tam Hominis quam Scientia)

Hic non jacet,

At Lutum quod assumpsit optimum

Infra ponitur :

Nam certe supra mortales emicuit

Moribus suavissimis,

Ingenio suavissimo pleno Pectore sapuit

Mundo sublimior,

Adeoq; aptior Angelorum Consortio,

Ætatis suæ 72.

Im-

*Impensis Pet. Curwenni,
Olim hujus Coll. Alumni.*

*The next, and undoubtedly the best Authority, is the most learned Dr. PEARSON, Bishop of Chester, who had been intimately acquainted with him *.*

Reader, if Mr. HALES were unknown unto thee, be pleased to believe what I know and affirm to be true of him; I shall speak no more than my own long Experience, intimate Acquaintance, and high Veneration grounded upon both, shall freely and sincerely prompt me to. He was a Man, I think, of as great a Sharpness, Quickness, and Subtilty of Wit, as ever this, or perhaps, any Nation bred. His Industry did strive, if it were possible, to equal the largeness of his Capacity, whereby he became as great a Master of Polite, Various, and Universal Learning, as ever yet conversed with Books. Proportionate to his Reading was his Meditation, which furnished him with a

* See his Preface to Mr. HALES's Golden Remains.

Judgment beyond the vulgar reach of Man, built upon unordinary Notions, raised out of strange Observations and comprehensive Thoughts within himself. So that he really was a most prodigious Example of an acute and piercing Wit, of a vast and illimited Knowledge, of a severe and profound Judgment.

Altho' this may seem, as in it self it truly is, a grand *Elogium*, yet I cannot esteem him less in any Thing which belongs to a good Man, than in those intellectual Perfections: And had he never understood a Letter, he had other Ornaments sufficient to endear him. For he was of a Nature (as we ordinarily speak) so kind, so sweet, so courting all Mankind; of an Affability so prompt, so ready to receive all Conditions of Men, that I conceive it near as easy a Task for any one to become so knowing as so obliging.

As a Christian, none more ever acquainted with the Nature of the Gospel, because none more studious of the
Know-

Knowledge of it, or more curious in the Search, which being strengthened by those great Advantages before mentioned, could not prove otherwise than highly effectual. He took indeed to himself a Liberty of judging, not of others, but for himself; and if ever any Man might be allowed in these Matters to judge, it was he who had so long, so much, so advantageously considered; and which is more, never could be said to have had the least worldly Designs in his Determinations. He was not only most truly and strictly Just in his secular Transactions, most exemplary Meek and Humble, notwithstanding his Perfections, but beyond all Example charitable, giving unto all, preserving nothing but his Books, to continue his Learning and himself; which when he had before digested, he was forced at last to feed upon, at the same Time the happiest and most unfortunate *Helluo* of Books, the grand Example of Learning, and of the Envy and Contempt which followeth it.

This

This Testimony may be truly given of his Person, and nothing in it liable to the least Exception, but this alone, that it comes far short of him : Which Intimation I conceive more necessary for such as knew him not, than all which hath been said.

I confess, while he lived none was ever more sollicitated and urged to write, and thereby truly to teach the World than he ; none ever so resolved (pardon the Expression, so Obstinate) against it. His facile and courteous Nature learnt only not to yield to that Solicitation. And yet he cannot be accused for hiding of his Talent, being so communicative, that his Chamber was a Church, and his Chair a Pulpit.

As for any farther Particulars of his Life, being confined to Brevity, I must refer the Reader to Mr. WOOD, and likewise to Dr. WALKER, and the late Historical and Critical Account of Mr. HALES's Life and Writings. The Author of which last Book has recovered many


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*valuable Circumstances and Transactions of
Mr. HALES's Life.*

I am perswaded, that the judicious Reader, upon perusal of this Discourse, will think it worthy of a Place among the best of Mr. HALES's Performances: And if it be objected, that his Stile is somewhat obsolete, let such know, that it is the Opinion of those who transmitted the Manuscript to me, and other judicious Persons who have seen these Sheets, that there are such Beauties in our Author's Language and Argument, as may make our modern Criticks blush.

E. Curll.

St. Michael,
Sept. 29, 1719.



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
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bliss.

E. Cuth.

St. Michael,
Sep. 22, 1719.



DISCOURSE

Of the several

Dignities, and Corruptions

MAN's Nature, since the FALL.

IT is an Opinion no less weak, than erroneous, and favouring as much of vulgar and common Judgments, as it is in it self prejudicial to the Advancement of Knowledge, to pass by all ordinary Occurrences without any Notice, or Admiration, and to think nothing wonderful that is common. This it is, which hath at all Times caused that usual Complaint, *Plin. lib. 8. Epist. 20.* that Men have been ever curious and eager Enquirers after Novelties, rather than Excellencies; and that the very nearness

B

of

Cicero de of worthy Objects, hath at once made them
 Divin. lib. 2. *both despised and unknown.* Thus, like

Children, with an idle Diligence, we turn over this great Book of Nature, without perusing those ordinary Characters, wherein is expressed the greatest Power of the Worker, and Excellency of the Work; fixing our Admiration on those unusual Novelties, which, tho' for their Rareness they may be more eminent, yet for their Nature, are less worthy. Every blazing Comet, or burning Meteor, strikes more Wonder in the Beholder, than those glorious Lamps of Nature, with their admirable Motions and Order, in which notwithstanding, the very Heathen could acknowledge a Divinity. *Sol spectato-*

rem, nisi cum deficit, non habet. Nemo ob-
 Cic. de Nat. Deo-
 rum lib. 2. *servat Lunam nisi laborantem, adeo natu-*
 Sen. Nat. *rale est, magis nova, quam magna mirari.*
 Qu. 1. 7. So sensible are we rather of Things new
 c. 1. than great, and weigh not so much
 their Worth as their Rareness. Where-

as indeed, Things of that Condition are not to be admired, but pitied rather, as being the Errors and Imperfections of Nature, implying Impotency, if the Effect be deficient, or Enormity, if superfluous. But things are said to be the Subjects of Wonder, in regard of the greater Perfection and Exactness

actness of their Nature ; such as always imply a more extraordinary Absoluteness of Power, and Eminency of Operation in the Worker. And of this Condition I may safely propose Man : A Creature, in whom if we consider how it has pleased that eternal Essence to stamp a most divine Character of his own infinite Perfections, and to make Him, amongst all his Works, the most universal Place of Residency for all created Excellency ; we cannot but acknowledge Him to be One of the greatest Wonders of the World, yea indeed, Himself a World. For altho' in a precise Reference or Collation of Man, with the Particulars of the greater Fabric, it be an Observation more witty than true, and favouring more of Poetry than Philosophy, that Man is a Microcosm, and Representative of Nature, yet if we understand that Proportion and mutual Reference only in a Generality, we shall find the Assertion verified, not only in Poetical Liberty, (in which Reason attends Imagination, and rather makes Objects, than finds them,) but also in the more strict, and severe Censures of Truth. For Instance ; As the whole World of Things consists either in spiritual or material Creatures, the spiritual agreeing in one general

Nature of reasonable, and understanding Essences; and the material ranging themselves into sundry Orders, some partaking of Motion only, as having nothing but Bodies; some of Life also, and that in sundry Degrees of Dignity and Perfection: So also Man in his Nature and Substance consisteth of Spirit, and of Matter; his Spirit a reasonable Essence, and a divine or celestial Essence; his Body a moving Body, and a living Body; and lastly, his Life, a mortal, and immortal Life. So that in this general Division, without farther Enquiry after the Proportion in the smaller Parcels of the World, it is true that every Man is a little and a living World. The Heavens, Elements and all mixt Bodies have their Motion, and so hath Man; The Herbs, Plants, &c. have their Vegetation, and so hath Man; The Beasts, Fishes, &c. have their Sense and Animality; so hath Man; The Angels, &c. have their Immateriality, Immortality and their Understanding, and so hath Man; Others will have the Will to represent the first Mover, because it is that, which can draw with that, and primarly set on work all subordinate Faculties. The Heart represents the Sun, as being in the Midst; the Blood, the Rivers; the Bones,

Bones, the Rocks; and the like : But because this Proportion, which I have already observed, is more Philosophical, and less Strained, I shall rest satisfied therewith. Here then, is a World to pass through and search, if the Sufficiency of a Surveyor could faithfully discover each Passage and Country thereof.

First, therefore, it shall not be needful to insist overmuch upon Man in his Materials, or sensitive Conditions, or to commend him in his Anatomy. Since this would be to communicate a far meaner Degree and Order; and as if he had no higher Pitch of Excellency, to borrow, and piece it up with, than Generalities; a Labour not only needless, but hurtful, as being a ready Way, by praising to Prejudice : For we commonly see, that as most Kind of Plants, or Trees exceed us in our Vegetation and Particles, so many Sorts of Beasts have a greater Activity, and Exquisite-ness in their Senses, than we. And the Reason is, because Nature aiming at a superior, and more excellent End, is in those lower Faculties more remiss and negligent. It shall suffice therefore only to lay a Ground-Work in these lower Parts, for the better Advancement of Man's greater Perfections, which have ever

Hooker
lib. 1. § 6.

ever some Dependance on them. For, whereas the principal Acts of Man's Soul, are either of Reason, proceeding from the Understanding, or of Practice from his Will; Both these have their Foundation in, or at least their Dependance on the Organs, and Faculties of the Body; which, in the one, precede, in the other, follow. To the one, they are as Porters, to admit, and convey; to the other, as Messengers, to perform, and execute. To the one, the whole Body is an Eye, through which it seeth; to the other, an Hand, by which, it worketh. In the Works of the Understanding, there must be a *Veni*, and a *Vidi*; before a *Vici*, and therefore, in these, the Offices of the Body precede. And in the Will, there must be a *Sit Volo*, before a *Sic Jubeo*: The *Actus Elicitus*, which respecteth the Soul, before the *Actus Imperatus*, which hath its Termination in the Body. And therefore here, the Ministry of the Body follows the Power and Authority of the Will. Concerning the Body therefore, this Truth is to be resolved on, That the reasonable Part of Man, in his present Estate, doth depend in all the Circumstances of its ordinary Operations, on the happy, or disordered Tempera-
ture of the Body. For tho' these Mini-

sterial Parts have not any Superiority,
 to Over-rule the Soul, yet they have a
 disturbing Power to hurt and hinder her
 Operations: And hence it is, that the
 sundry Diseases of the Body do often-
 times slacken, yea sometimes consume,
 and quite extirpate the deepest Impres-
 sions, and most infixed and settled Ha-
 bits of the Soul. For as in the Body
 Politick, the Prince, (whom Seneca
 calls the Soul of the Commonwealth.) *Sen. De*
 receiverh either no Passages of State, or *Clement.*
 false Ones, where there is Negligence, *lib. 1. c. 4.*
 or Disability in those subjectate Inqui-
 rers, (whom Xenophon terms the Eyes, *Cyropad.*
 and Ears of Kings.) *lib. 6.* In like Manner the
 Soul of Man being as yet not an abso-
 lute and independent Worker, but
 receiving all her Motions from the In-
 formation of the bodily Instruments,
 must continue like a meer *rasa Tabula*,
 if they out of Indisposition or Disabili-
 ty be weakened. The Soul hath not
 in it self that eminent Weakness, which
 is observable in many Men, but only as
 it is overshadowed, and eclipsed, with
 the Interposition of earthly, and slug-
 gish Organs. In the Operations of
 Men's Souls, there are two Defects;
 one, an Imperfection of them; the other,
 an Inequality of them. The former of
 these I do not so ascribe to bodily Weak-
 ness,

ness, as if I conceived no Darknes in-
trinsically rooted in the Soul it self:
But for the Inequality and Difference of
Men's Understanding in their several
Operations, I suppose that principally
proceeds from the Temperature of the
instrumental Faculties of the Body, in
some, yielding enablement for quick-
ness of Apprehension, in others, pressing
down, and entangling the Understand-
ing. And therefore Aristotle in the
seventh Book of his Politicks, ascribes
the Difference and Inequality, which
he observes between the Asiatick, and
European Wits, unto the several Cli-
mates, and Temperature of the Regions
in which they lived, according where-
unto, the Complexions and Constitu-
tions of their Bodies only could be al-
tered; the Soul being in it self (accord-
ing to the same Aristotle in his third
Book *de Anima*) impassible, and unal-
terable from any bodily Agents; and
to the same Purpose again he saith, that if
an old Man had a young Man's Eyes, his
Sight would be as sharp, and as distinct
as a young Man's is. So then it is mani-
fest that the Weakness of Apprehensi-
on in the Souls of Men, comes not from
any Darknes inseparably accompany-
ing them, but only from that necessary
Co-existence which it hath with a
Body

Aristot.
Politic.
lib. 7.

Arist. de
Anima,
lib. 3.

Body ill disposed for Information and Assistance. For he that is carried in a Coach (and the Body is *vehiculum Animæ*) tho' he were of himself more nimble and active, must yet receive such Motion as it confers: And he that reads through Spectacles, tho' of himself he be happily sharp Sighted, yet must be content with the Impression of such Species as the Proportion and Quality of the Glass affordeth. But this Dependance is not so necessary, but that the Soul may be exempted, and vindicated from the Oppression of the Body; and that, first in extraordinary, and next in more common Actions; in Actions extraordinary, as those most pious and religious Operations, of the Soul, Assent, Faith, Invocation, and wherein the Soul is carried beyond the Sphere of Sense, and transported into a more elevate Operation. For, to believe and know, that there are laid up for pious and holy Endeavours, those Joys, which Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, and to have some few Glimpses and Fruition of them, (which St. Paul calls *Arrhabo*, ^{*Ephef. 1.*} ^{*14. Rom.*} *Primitias Spiritus*) What is this 8. 23. but to leave Sense behind, and out-run our Bodies? [See this learnedly handled by Mr. Hooker, lib. 3. sect. 8. and Bacon's Advancement of Learning, lib. 2.

fol. 109.] Divine Truth doth as much repugn the Reason, as Divine Goodness the Will of Man. Sarah laughed when Abraham believed; and the Philosophers mocked when St. Paul disputed: And Reason expected that the Apostle should have fallen down dead, when contrarily Faith shook the Viper into the Fire. There is a great Difference between the Manner of yielding our Assents to God, and unto Nature; for in Philosophy, we first know, and then believe; But Divinity, on the other Side, goeth *Ordine retrogrado*, working Science by Faith: And yet even Religion it self hath afforded Sense such a Confinity, as to give it some Manner of Service and Light, in that great Mystery. For the whole Doctrine of Christ, tho' some Parts thereof be exempted from sensitive Apprehension, yet generally is delivered by Parables, Similitudes, Proverbs and the Faith in Christ confirmed by the Sacraments, such, as are most agreeable to the Capacity, and in the Sight of the Senses.

Now, for the Exemption of the more ordinary Actions of the Soul from any Sway or Predominance of the Body, it is chiefly wrought by these three Means, Education, Custom, Occasion: And therefore by the Rule of Aristotle, tho'

in

(II)

in Agents purely Natural it holds true, Ethic. lib.
yet in Man it is not universal, That 2. c. 1.
any thing, which comes by Nature, is
alterable by Custom. For we com-
monly see, that the Tillage and Culture
of the Mind doth many times draw
it away from the Barrenness of its own
Nature.

*Exercetq; frequens Tellurem, atq; imperat
Arvis.*

Education then and Custom do, as
it were, cozen the Body and revenge
Nature; insomuch, that tho' Elements,
Climates, Complexions, &c. do work
the Mind unto an unhappy Temper,
yet by a continual grappling with these
Prejudices it getteth at last the Victo-
ry, tho' not without much Reluctancy
and Rebellion in Nature; she being
never so thoroughly conquered, but that
she Ever continues in her Opposition:
And as for Occasion; That alters the
natural Inclination of the Will, and
Affection, rather than of the Under-
standing; for so we see, that the Bent
of Mens Desires carry them oftentimes,
by reason of Occurrences contrary to
the Disposition, which the State of the
Body hath stamped on them. Thus we
often read of Men in War, who not-

withstanding of themselves timorous, and yielding, yet, when the Condition of the Place hath taken away all Occasions of Flight and the Cruelty of the Adversary all Hope of Mercy if they should be subdued, have strangely forsaken their own Inclinations, and gotten strange and prosperous Victories by an unnatural Fortitude.

Now, for those inward Senses, which are commonly accounted three, I take the two latter to have a more eminent Degree of Perfection in Man, as being indeed the Foundations and Grounds of the Operations of the Soul, Memory, and Fancy, or Imagination. Here, by Memory, I understand not the bare and simple Act of that Faculty, which is the Conservation of some Object formerly treasured up, but that rather which the Latines call *Reminiscencia*, or *Recordatio*, which is a Reviving, or, as we speak, a Calling to Mind of former Objects, with a Kind of Discourse, and Meditation of them. The Dignity hereof in Man is seen, both by the perfecting the Understanding of Man in Matter of Learning and Discourse, as also by affording special Assistance in the Direction and Managing of our Actions, conforming them either to the Rules of Morality, or the Principles of Practice

Practice gathered from Historical Observations, while the Mind, by the Help of the Memory, is, as it were, conversant with past Ages.

The principal Corruptions of this Faculty, are, 1. Too great Slightness, and Shallowness of Observation, when, out of an Impatience of profound Search, and a gluttonous Desire to feed upon the Objects of Worth, and Use, the Earnestness of Appetite weakens the Digestion; and the Eagerness to take in, makes Men forgetful to retain. This is the Reason why many Men wander over all Arts, and Sciences, without any Solidity in any. They make not any solemn Journey to a particular Coast and Head of Learning; but view all, as it were, in *transitu*; have no sooner begun to settle on one, but they are in haste to visit another. But such Men are no more able to find the Use, or search the Bottom of any Learning, than he, that rides Post, is, to make a Description, and Map, of his Journeys, tho' by much Employment he may toil and sweat in traveling from Place to Place; *Omnis Festinatio ceca est*; Windings, and Instability of the Wit, as well as Body, dazzle and disable the Eye, and it is true in the Mind, as well as in the Stomach,

too quick a Digestion doth always more distemper than nourish, and argues nothing but Crudities in Learning. The Reason is, because our Memories are always joined with some Measure of Love; where the Treasure is, there will the Mind be also. Where therefore our Love is most constant, our Memories will be most faithful. Thus sudden, vanishing, and broken Desires, which, like the Appetites of sick Men, are for the time violent, but give presently over, as they argue an eager Love of what we pursue, and by Consequence, a Disesteem of that, which we soon forsake, so do they necessarily infer Weakness in the Memory, by how much they make our Hopes the stronger. For, (as Seneca speaks) *Caduca Memoria futuro imminetium*. Other Causes there are, as namely the Links of the Parts of the Body of an Homogenial Science, which communicate to each other, Strength and Lustre; and therefore Impatience in the thorough Search of them must needs infer Forgetfulness. Another Cause may be Distrust; and therefore an Unexercise of it; and on the other Extreme, a too great Confidence in it, and thereupon a burthening and oppressing it with a Multitude of Notions.

Now

Aristot.
Rhet. lib.
2. c. 12.

Seneca, de
Ben. lib. 3
c. 3.

Now for the Imagination; The Dignity hereof consists either in the Office, or in the Latitude of it. Its Office is to be assistant both to the Understanding and the Will. Its assistance to the Understanding, is principally in Matter of Invention, to supply it with Variety of Objects whereon to contemplate, as also to quicken and elevate the Mind with a Kind of Heat, and Rapture proportionable in the inferior Part of the Soul, to that, which in the superiour, Philosophers call Extrasy; whereby it is possessed with such a strong Delight in its proper Object, that the Operations thereof are restless, and violent. And of this Kind is that of the Poet,

Est Deus in nobis, agitante Calescimus Illo.

Hence it is, that Men of low and narrow Imaginations, who have no Sharpness and Activity in that Part, are commonly of as slow Capacities; to whom nothing is facile and natural, but with much Reluctancy, and Violence beaten out. Thus Fancy is, as I may so speak, the Sluice, through which all Men's intellectual Operations have both their Entrance and Diffusion.

The

The Office of the Imagination to the Will is, to further and increase its Desire towards some convenient Object. For it often comes to pass, that the Imagination sways more with the Will, than Argument, and hath a more immediate, and powerful Insinuation to perswade, than the Peremptoriness of Reason hath to command. And the Reason hereof is, because Liberty being Essential to Man's Will, that Course must needs most of all perswade the Faculty, which doth infer the least Violence to the Liberty, that is done rather by Argument of Delight, than of Necessity. For Man's Will is a Monarch, and therefore that is true in Part, which Seneca hath observed of Kings. *Apud Reges, etiam qua profunt, ita tamen, ut delectent, suadenda sunt.* Not driving them thereunto by Logical Illations, but by alluring them by the Sweetness of Eloquence; not pressing the Necessity of Morality by naked Argument, but rather secretly instilling it into the Will, that it might at last find it self reformed, and yet not perceive how it came so. Another Reason is, because the Desires of Men are fixt as well on Pleasure as Profit; so that those Inducements must needs have most

most Authority, which have that Mixture of *Utile*, and *Dulce*, together.

Concerning the Latitude of this Faculty, it hath therein a double Prerogative above other Powers. One, the Multiplicity of Thoughts; another, in the framing of Objects. Now, by Thoughts, I understand those Springings and Glances of the Heart, grounded upon the sudden Representation of sundry and different Objects. For when the Mind once begins to be fixt and permanent, I call it rather Meditation than Thought. The Multiplicity of Thought is grounded, first, upon the Transcendency, and Abundance of the Objects; and next upon the Activity and Quickness of the Apprehension. The former I call Transcendency of Objects, because, in the Latitude and Universality thereof, it includes all the Variety of Objects that belong unto other Faculties; and for the Quickness of Working, the Motions of the Thoughts agree in two great Contraries, Suddenness of Journey, and Vastness of Way; while like Lightning, they are able to reach from one End of the Heaven to another; and with one Light and imperceptible Excursion, to leave almost no Part of Nature untravelled.

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The next Thing is the Latitude of Imagination in framing of Objects; wherein indeed it hath a larger Privilege than other Faculties. For, Reason and all other Faculties have their fixt Limits, and Determinations in Nature: But the Imagination is a Faculty boundless and impatient of any imposed Limits, save those which it self maketh. And hence it is, that in Matter of Perswading, and Insinuation, Poetry, Mythology, and Eloquence, (the Arts of Imagination) have ever (as was observed) been more forcible than those that have been rigorously grounded on Nature and Reason. It being (as Scaliger excellently observes) the natural Infiniteness of the Soul. *Aspernari certorum finium prescriptionem.* Now the Liberty of the Imagination is Threefold. 1. Creation (as I may so speak) and new making of Objects. 2. Composition, or mere mixing them; and 3. Translation, or placing them. To the first belong those Poetical Deities, and Metamorphoses, and the like; To the other, those monstrous Chimeras; such as Horace speaks of,

Scal. Exercit 307.
11.

*Humano Capiti cervicem Pictor Equinam
Si jungat*——

To

To the Third, those Allegories and Rhetorical Metaphors. All which, tho' in themselves they be false, yet do so couch and wrap up Truth, that it is made, thro' their Appearance, more forcible and operative.

Now for the Corruptions of this Faculty, I conceive the Principal to be these Three. 1. *Error*. 2. *Levity*. 3. *Stupidity*. The Error of the Imagination may be taken actively and passively; the Error which it produceth, and the Error which it beareth. Hence those strange and strong Delusions, wherewith the Minds of melancholy Men (in whom this Faculty hath the most piercing Operation) have been peremptorily possessed. Hence those vanishing and shadowy Assurances, Hopes, Fears, Joys, Visions, which the Dreams of Men, the immediate Issue of this Power do produce, which whether it be done by affecting only the Fancy, and that with so strong Possession, as gives no Admission to the Species of outward Things, or whether it be done by the Impression of such Forms and Shapes upon the Spirits, that are to spread themselves upon the outward Senses, as may thereby affect them with the same Images (not by Reception from without, but by Impression

Aristot.

Problem.

Sect. 10.

Probl. 12.

and Transfusion from within) it is plain, not only by various Relations, but by continual Experience what strong Effects and powerful Consequences it hath had.

The Errors that are in the Fancy, are for the most Part of the same Nature with those that are wrought by it; such was the Error of that Man, who would not be perswaded but that he had Horns in his Forehead, and for that Reason would not move forth, nor uncover his Face to any. Certainly, Jealousy is the Work of Fancy; and he deserves such a Punishment that belies himself with it. And the Causes of these Errors are by Francis Mirandula ascribed. 1. To the Variety of Temper in the Body, with the Predominance of those four Humours, which give Complexion thereunto. 2. The Imposture of the outward Senses. 3. Tho least of all, to the Government of the Will. Lastly, to the Ministry of Angels; of which we find an Example (as I conceive) in that evil Spirit, which promised to be a lying Spirit in the Mouth of Ahab's Prophets, &c. And by the Way, from the three first Causes, we may observe the Misery of Man's corrupted Nature, wherein those Powers, which were ordained for

for mutual Assistance, do now exercise a mutual Imposture. And as Man did join with a fellow Creature to dishonour, and (if it had been possible) to cozen his Maker; so in the Faculties we may discover a joint Conspiracy in the working of their own Overthrow and Reproach, and a secret Joy in one, to be deluded by another.

The next Corruption is Levity, and too much Volubility of this Power, proceeding from the over swift Obtrusion of the Species thereupon, whereby it is so oppressed with that floating and unconstant Humour, that it maketh many needless Excursions upon impertinent Things; and interrupts the Course of its entire and natural Operations. There may be a time, when the Fancy may have Liberty to Expatiate: But again, Some Objects will require a more penetrating, and permanent Act. And therefore to have a vanishing and lightning Fancy, that knows not how to fasten it self on any Particular; but like an Object of divers Colours, shall either in one, or an immediate Succession of Acts, present unto the Understanding an Heap of Species, and so distract its Operation, argues, not Sufficiency, but Weakness and Distemper in this Power.

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The last Corruption of this Faculty, is Heaviness, and Stupidity, from whose peremptory Adhesion with too violent an Intention of the Fancy on some particular Objects, it many times wrought, not only a Dulness of Mind, a Syncope, and Benumbing of the Faculty it self, but oftentimes even Madness, Distraction, and Torment, which is the Reason why some Men either out of the Depth of their Contemplation on some Difficulties of Learning, (as it is reported of Aristotle in his Meditation of the Fluxes of the Sea) or out of some deep Passion, as Love, Fear, Despair, and the Like, have attempted such strange Practices on themselves and others, as could not but proceed from a smothered, and entangled Reason.

Thus much shall suffice, touching Man's common and Corporeal Faculties. I proceed now to the Soul.

Of which I must speak in a double Reference, either according to the Motions and Impressions which it maketh on the Body, and receiveth from it; or according to the immanent and uncommunicated Perfections, which it hath residing only in its own Essence. Touching the former, I refer those Effects, which are meerly from the Body

Body to the Soul, as the Tempers and Humours thereof, to the Enquiry of Physicians, &c. And shall in this Place only observe that, which is more Essential to Man; I mean the Generality and the Particulars of the Passions of his Mind, with the most eminent Dignities and Corruptions which the Soul and Body of Man contracteth from them.

Passions then are nothing but those natural, perfective, and unconstrained Motions of the Things whereunto they agree, unto that Advancement, or Elevation of their Natures, which they are, by the Wisdom, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their own several Spheres, and according to the Proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular Inclination unto those Objects, whose Goodness bears a natural Conveniency, or Virtue of Satisfaction towards their Powers: Or, by an Antipathy, or Aversion from those, which bearing a Contrariety to the Good they desire, must needs be noxious and destructive, and by Consequence, odious to their Natures. This being the Property of all, (I mean still unconstrained, and Self Motions,) and Passion very evidently partaking of that Nature; It follows that

that the Root and Ground of all Passions, is principally the Good, and secondarily, and by Consequence the Ill of Things. This being premised touching the Nature, and general Essence of Passions, the Division of them must be grounded thereon. Now since all Appetite (which I make here proportional to Passion), being a blind Power, is independant on the Direction of Knowledge, from the Diversity of Knowledge in, or annexed to things, may be gathered the prime Distinction of Passions. Now Knowledge, in respect of created Agents, may be considered, either as disjoined and extrinsecal to the things moved, or as intrinsic and united thereunto; which Knowledge serves as a Law and Rule to regulate each Nature, that they might ever have Reference to some fixed End, not various and casual. Passions that proceed from that severed and extrinsecal Knowledge, are the Motions of meerly natural Agents, which are governed to their particular or general Ends, by the Wisdom and Power of Him that made them. But the Passions of Reason proceed from a Knowledge conjoined, and intrinsic to the Mover, which is threefold; Mental, Sensitive, Rational.

*Vid. Hooker, lib. 3.
§ 3. p. 8.*

From

From all which arise sundry Degrees of Passions and Motions. Mental Passions are those purer and abstracted Delights, or other the like Agitation of the supreme Part of the Mind, which Aristotle calls *νῆς*, the Latines, *Mens*, or *Apex Mentis*: Wherein is the least Commerce and Intermixtion with inferior and earthly Powers, which Motions are grounded, 1. On an extraordinary Knowledge of Vision, or Revelation; such as was Paul's *Novi* ^{2 Cor. 12.} *hominem raptum*; &c. And the Prophets^{2.} and Holy Mens of God Visions; or on an exquisite natural Apprehension, wherein Aristotle placed his greatest Felicity; to wit, in the highest and divinest Contemplations of Truths, which he makes to be the Object of the supreme Part of the Soul. And it was the Speech of a Philosopher (viz. Heraclitus) to the same Purpose, *Anima sicca est Sapientissima*. That a Mind not steeped in the Humours of carnal and gross Affections, nor drowned in the Waves of a tumultuous Fancy, but more elevate and soaring to its Original, by divine Contemplations, is always endowed with greater Wisdom. And this Passion of the Mind is indeed nothing else but the Love thereof, or at least, an immediate Effect flowing

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from Love, and not barely from the Knowledge, and Vision of Truth.

Sensitive Passions are those Motions of Prosecution, or Flight, which are grounded on the Fancy, and on the Apprehension of the common Sense, and is common to brute Beasts; which indeed, (if we will believe Seneca) are not Affections, but certain Characters and Impressions, *ad similitudinem Passionum*, which he calls *Impetus*, and *Affectuum Vestigia*; the violent Motions of Nature, and the Shadows, or Footsteps of Affections.

I come therefore briefly to those middle Passions, which I call Rational; not formally, as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason, or barely Immaterial Motions of the Soul; but by way of Participation, or Dependence; by Reason of their immediate Subordination in Man, unto the Government of the Will and Understanding, and not barely of the Fancy; which two are the principal Superintendents in Man's Actions. And thus Aristotle accounts the sensitive Appetite, (tho' in it self Brutish) to be, in some Sort, a reasonable Faculty. Now Passion thus considered, is divided according to the several References it hath to its Objects; which is principally the Good,
and

and secondarily the Ill of Things. And either considered after a sundry Manner: For they may be taken either barely or alone; or under some Consideration of some Difficulty and Danger of Miscarriage. And both these are to be determined by some particular Condition of Union, or Distance to the Subject; for all Objects offend or delight the Power in Virtue of their Union thereunto. The Object then, may be considered simply in its own Nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other Circumstances; including only the natural Conveniency, or Disproportion, which it beareth to the Faculty; and so the Passions are, in respect of Good, Love; in respect of Evil, Hatred: Which are the two Radical, Fundamental, and the most transcendent Passions of all the rest; and therefore well called, *Pondera & Impetus Animi*. Secondly, The Object may be considered as absent from the Subject, in regard of real Union, tho never without that *Unto Objectiva*; and the Object thus considered, worketh, if Good, Desire; if Evil, Flight, and Abomination. Thirdly, It may be considered as present, by a real Contact, or Union; and so it worketh, if Good, Delight and Pleasure; if Evil, Grief and

Sorrow. Again, as the Object bears with it the Circumstances of Difficulty and Danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the natural Strength of the Power, which includeth, in Good, an Impossibility to be obtained, and so it worketh Despair; and in Evil, a great Diffidence, and Unlikelihood of being avoided, and so it worketh Fear: Or secondly, as not exceeding the Possibility of the Power, whether in Good, which it presenteth as attainable, and so it worketh Hope; or in Evil, which it presenteth as avoidable, and so it worketh Boldness: Or as requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh Anger.

Having thus laid the general Division of Passions, before I speak of the Particulars, I must speak something of the Generalities of Passions, and what Dignities are therein most notable, and the most notable Defects.

Now, Passions may be the Subject of a threefold Discourse, Natural, Moral, and Civil. In their natural Consideration we should observe in them their essential Properties; their Ebbs and Flows; their Springings and Decays; the Manner of their Impressions. In their moral Consideration we may likewise search how the Indifferency of them

them is altered into the Domination of Good, or Evil, by Virtue of the Perturbation and Violence of their own Motions, or of the Dominion of right Reason; what their Ministry is in Virtuous; and what their Power and Independence in irregular Actions; How they are raised and suppressed, slackned and governed, according to the particular Nature of these Things, which require their Motion. In their Civil, and Judicial Respect, we should also observe, how they may be severally wrought upon, and impressed; How, and in what Manner, and what Occasions it is fit to gather, and fortify, or to slacken and remit them, as may be most advantageous to the End proposed. What Use may be made of each Man's particular Age, Nature, and Propension, for the Advancement of the publick Peace and Honour: And this Use of Passion is copiously observed in a learned Discourse of Aristotle's, the second Book of his Rhetorick: And I will omit it, as desiring a greater Insight, &c. than my small Experience can reach unto. The Dignities, which arise from either of the other, I shall in Part observe, tho' not distinctly, and asunder, but in a brief, and confused Collection of some Particulars, using this

this Order. First, observing them according to the Antecedents of their Motions and Acts: Secondly, according to the Acts themselves; and thirdly, according to the Consequences of them.

Touching the Antecedents to the Act of Passion, they are either outward Motives thereunto, as namely the Object, unto which it is carried, and the Causes whereby it is occasioned; or the inward Root, or Principals of the Act, whereby they are wrought and governed. The two former are more observable in the particular Passions, especially the latter of them; and therefore thither I refer their distinct Handling. For the third, the Dignity of Passion chiefly consists in a Consonancy and Obedience to the Prescriptions of Reason; For there is in Man's Faculties a natural Subordination, whereby the Actions of the inferior, receive their Motion and Direction, from the Influence of the other. Now Appetite was in Beasts only made to be governed by a sensitive Knowledge; but in Man Sense ought not to have any commanding, or moving Power, but only an instrumental, ministerial and conveying Power, in respect of the Object. The Action of the Sense was not ordained to touch the Affection, but to present it self primarily

marily to the Understanding, upon whose Determination and Conduct the Passions were to depend, to submit all their Inclinations thereunto, and to be its Ministers in the Execution of all such Duties, as it should deem any Way expedient for the Perfection and Advancement of Man's Nature: So that herein consists a great Part of Man's Ruin by the Fall, that albeit the Understanding it self be blinded, and therefore not able to reach unto the true Presentation of any perfect Good to the inferior Parts; yet that small Portion of Light, which it yet retaineth, for the Government of our Actions, is made uneffectual, and sufficient only to convince, not to reform. The Corruption then, of Passion in this Respect, is the Independence thereof upon its true Principle, when it stays not to look for, but anticipates and prevents the Discourses of Reason, relying only on the Judgment of Sense, with which it retains an unnatural Union: So that herein is mainly verified that Complaint, *Homo in Honore*, &c. Man being in Honour was without Understanding, and is become as the Beasts of the Field that perish. For, as in the Body, if any Part be dissolved, and not knit unto the Parts adjoining, by Nerves

Ethic. lib.
1. c. 13.

Nerves and Sinews, it cannot yield Obedience unto the Government of the motive Faculty, but when that would wry them one Way, they fall another; so it is in the Mind of Man; when that natural Continuity and Union of Faculties is once dissolved, when Affections are by some secret Schism disunited from Reason, there cannot be that sweet Harmony in the Motions thereof, which is required to the Weal and Honour of Man's Nature. Passions though of excellent Worth and Service for the heating and enlivening of Virtue, for adding Spirit and Edge to all good Designs, and blessing them with an happier Issue, than they could alone attain unto; yet if once they forsake their Bonds, and become subject only to their own Laws, if they encroach upon Reason's Right, and dare once usurp the Throne, and, like Fire, break those Limits prescribed to them, there is then nothing more Tumultuous, Tyrannical, and Irreclaimable; *Nec meliores unquam servos, nec dominos natura sentit deteriores.*

For it is true, as well in Man's little Commonwealth, as in greater Estates, there are no more pestilent and pernicious Disturbers of the publick Good, than those which are best qualified for
Service

Service and Employment, if once they grow mutinous and impatient, neglecting the common Advancement for their own private Ambitions, and desirous to raise their own Supremacy by the Ruin of the whole. And indeed, it is universally true, Things most useful and excellent in their Regularity, are most dangerous in their Abuse and Obliquity.

The next Consideration was according to the Exercise of the Act of Passions, which may be considered either according to the general Substance, or some particular Accidents, in the Manner of its Being. For the first, it is altogether Good, as being Nothing else but natural Motion, ordained for the Perfection, and Conservation of the Creature. And in this Consideration (so it be always Motion Natural, that is governed by, and dependeth on right Reason) I find not any Corruption, tho' I find an Error and Abuse. That, I mean, which maketh Passion in general a Defect and Perturbation, and would therefore reduce the Mind to a senseless Apathy, condemning all the Life of Passion, as Wars, serving for nothing else but to toss and trouble Reason: An Opinion, which, whilst it goeth about to give unto Man an absolute

solute Supremacy and Government over himself, leaveth scarce any thing in him, which he may command and govern. For altho' there be in the Will towards the Body, an *Imperium*, or Sovereign commanding Act, yet in Propriety and Vigour, this is not so much to be termed Command, as Employment; the Body being rather the Instrument, than the Servant of the Soul; and the Power which the Will hath over it, is not so much the Command of a Master over his Workmen, as of a Workman over his Tools. The chief Subjects to the Will are the Affections; in the right Government whereof are manifested the largest Extents of its Absoluteness and Power. The Strength of every thing is exercised by Opposition: We see not the Violence of a River till it meet with a Bridge; and the Obstinacy of Winds shews not it self in the empty Air, till it meet with Woods to grapple with. So it is in the Will, whose Power is not exercised in the uncontrouled Command of the Body, but rather in the repairing the Breaches, and settling the Mutinies, wherewith untamed Affections disquiet the Peace of Man's Nature; since Enormity and Rebellion, in Things otherwise of so great Use, require Amendment, not Extirpation;

and

and we make strait a crooked Thing, not break it: And therefore, as He, in Tacitus, spake well to Otho, about to kill himself; *Majori animo tolerari adversa, quam relinqui*; so may I say of the Passions of the Mind, there is more Honour in subduing them, than in killing them; and that both the Power and the Profit of the Will is more advanced by the Yoke, than by Death; by the tributary Service, than by the Confusion, and Extirpation of them.

Now, concerning the Accidents or Manner of those Acts, that are from Passion, it may be considered, either in Regard of their Quantity, or Extension, or their Quality, and Intension. And both these may be considered two Manner of Ways. The Quantity of Passions is either continued in Respect of their Durance, or severed in Respect of the Multiplicity, and Re-iteration of them. The same must be said of the Quality of them, wherein sometimes they are too remiss, and defective; sometimes again too excessive, loose and exorbitant, according to the Variety of Conditions. Now concerning all these I observe this one general Rule. The Permanency, or Vanishing, the Multiplicity or Slowness, the Excess or Defect of any Passion, is to be grounded

on, and regulated by the Nature only of its Object, as it bears Reference to such or such a Person, but never by the private Humour, Complexion, Prejudice, Habit, Custom, or the like Qualifications of the Mind it self. To see a Man of senseless, and unapprehensive, or, in better Terms, of a mild and gentle Nature, overpass some small Indignities without Notice or Feeling; or to see a Man of an hot and eager Temper possessed with the Extremity of a tedious Passion, upon the Sense of some greater Injury, wherein his Honour and good Name is in Danger of being tainted, is not in either of these any great Matter of Commendation. Because tho' the Nature of the Object did in both warrant the Quality of the Passions, yet in such Persons they proceed out of Personal Humour and Complexion; and not out of a serious Consideration of the Injuries themselves. Of these two Extrems the Deficient is not so commonly seen, as that which is in Excess and Enormity: And therefore we will a little here observe what Course may be taken for the allaying this Vehemency of our Affections, whereby they disturb the Peace and Tranquility of Man's Mind: And this is done either by opposing contrary Passion

Vid. Ethic
lib. 2. c. 9
& lib. 10.
c. 1.

sion to Contrary, and so as it were plucking the Thoughts back into other Meditations; as Husbandmen use to do with those Trees that are crooked; or else it is done by scattering, and distracting of them, and that, not only by the Power of Reason; but sometimes also by cautelous Admixture of Passions amongst themselves, thereby interrupting their free Course, and Current. For as oftentimes the Afflictions of the Mind are bred one of another, as Grief by Anger. (*Circumspexit eos cum Ira condolens*) and Fear by Love. (*Res est plena timoris Amor*) and Desire by Fear; (*Fingebat metum, quo magis concupisceret*) &c. Mark 3. Tac. Hist. lib. 1. and so in the rest: So are some Passions stoped, or at least bridled and moderated by others; (*Amor ejicit metum*) 1. 7 b. 4. 18. Thus we see in the Body Military, (as *Hooker Tacit.*) *Unus tumultus est alterius Remedium*: And in the Body Natural, some Diseases are expelled by others; so likewise, in the Body Moral, Passions, as they mutually generate, so they weaken each other. Whether the Passions we admit be contrary, as Physicians cure a dead Passion by a burning Fever; or whether they be only of a different tho' not repugnant Nature, and then the Effect is wrought by revoking some of those

those Spirits, which are otherwise all employed in the Service of one Passion, by diverting the Intension of the Mind from one strait Channel, into sundry cross and broken Streams; as Men use to stop one Flux of Blood by making another; which Dissipation of Passions, as it is principally wrought by confounding them amongst themselves; so in some particular Passions, two other Ways, either by the Communication of them, in divers Subjects, or Extension of them on many Objects. The first is seen in Matter of Grief; The

Et hic lib. Mind doth receive, as it were, some
9. 6. 11. Relief, and feel some few Glimpses of Comfort, when it finds its Passion generative on others, and produce Sympathy, and the like Effect of them; for hereby it is, as it were, disburthened by the Transfusion of its own Sorrow, and cannot but find that lighter, to the sustaining whereof it hath the Assistance of other Men's Shoulders: And they were good, tho' common Observations: *Cura leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent, & Ille dolet vere qui sine Teste dolet.* That Grief is most unsupportable, which hath fewest Vents to diffuse it self. For the latter, we may see how Multiplicity of Objects doth weaken and remit a Passion; As for Ex-

ample

ample, Love. I take it, that that Man *Aristot.*
 that hath a more universal Love, hath *Ethic. lib.*
 a less vehement Love, and the spread-*8 c. 6, &*
 ing of the Affection is the weakening *lib. 9. c. 10*
 of it. (I mean in Things Heteroge-
 neal, and not Subordinate; for a Man
 may love a Wife more with Children
 than without, because they are the Seals *Σύνδε-*
 and Pledges of that Love.) For being *μὲν πρὸς*
 but one in Him, the Rays and Affecti-
 ons, as the Sun-beams in a Glass be-
 ing more united, might withall be more
 fervent. I remember not, that I ever
 read of a miraculous and admirable
 Love amongst Men, which went be-
 yond Couples; And therefore we see *φιλίας*
 that in that Estate, there is the greatest *ὑμνεύμενας*
 Affection wherein is least Community *ἐν δύο*
 Nuptial Love, as it is the most indivi-
 sible, so is it regularly the strongest. *ἀγνοῦται.*
 I do not then (by the Way) condemn
 all the strong and united Passions, but
 only I observe how those, which from
 this Union are Exorbitant, and work
 Prejudice to the Soul, may by a sea-
 sonable Distraction of them be reduced
 unto an wholesome Temper. For as it
 is noted amongst Men, those who have
 Bodies most obnoxious to daily Mala-
 dies, are commonly more secure from
 any mortal Danger, than those who
 free from general Distempers, do yet
 find

find the Surprize of one more violent. So is it with Men's Passions: Those, which have a Nature subject unto Variety of them, and are ready upon every Occasion to break out into them, do commonly find them less offensive, than they, who have not their Passions so voluble, and ready to spread themselves on divers Objects, but exercising their Intention more earnestly upon one.

The last Consideration of Passions was according to their Consequents, which are the Ends and Effects of them. The most general good Effect of Passions is that, which Tully hath observed of Anger, that they are the Sharpners and Whetstones of Virtue, which makes it more Operative and Fruitful. Thus Anger and Zeal whet on Fortitude, and sharpen its Sword; Love, Sympathy, and Compassion, are the Inciters of Bounty; Hope is the Stay and Anchor of Patience; Fear is the Sharpner of Industry, and Caution, and a Counterpoise in all our Actions against Violence, Rashness and Indiscretion. Those Imputations therefore of those Stoical Philosophers, which call these Passions Diseases, and Perturbations of the Mind, are but light and empty. For it is absurd to think that all Man's Rest is either healthful, or clear;

clear; or on the other Side, that all Motions are diseased and troubled: For what Water is more sweet and transparent than that of a Spring, which is in perpetual sliding? Or what more thick and loathsome, than that which standeth in a Puddle corrupting it self? The Agitation then of Passions, as long as they serve only to drive forward, not to drown Virtue; so long as they keep to their Dependance on Reason, and run only in that Channel, wherewith they thereby are bounded and confined, are of excellent Service in all the Concerns of Man's Life; and such, as without which, the Growth, the Success, the Dispatch of Virtue would be much impeded and impaired.

For the corrupt Effects of Passions in general, they are many more. They may either be, in Respect of themselves, one amongst another; or in Respect of the Understanding, Will and Body. The first is the mutual Generation one of another, which I have already touched: The which is not always a corrupt Effect, but only then, when in the Passion generating there is some Irregularity. In Respect of the Understanding, and Will, I conceive

ceive the Corruptions to be principally four.

*See Dr.
Field on
the Church
lib. 3. c.
26. & Ti-
len. Syn-
tag. Disp.
33. part 1.*

The first is, Imposture, and Seduction, concerning which we are first to remember, that there is in every Man a Nature and original Struggling between Appetite and Reason, which yet proceeds from Corruption and the Fall of Man; not from Nature entire, (as the Papists contend) For tho' the Light of Reason be by Man's Fall much dimmed, and decayed; yet those small Glimmerings thereof, which remain, are so adverse to our unruly Appetite, as that it laboureth against us, as the Philistines against Sampson, to deprive us of those small Reliques, and Reminders of Sight, which we yet retain; and being impatient altogether of a Check or Resistance, endeavoureth all it can to muffle Reason, and to obliterate those Principles, and original Truths, which could not but restrain the Unruliness of such Rebellious Subjects, if they might be suffered to shine forth clearly upon them. And hence it is, that every Man when he hath given Place to the Violence of Appetite, laboureth next to incline, and prepare his Mind for Assent, and to get Reason on the same Side with Passion. And one Reason hereof may be a Love

of

of our Passion; for Passion joined with Reason, is like to an Humour, that falling down from the Head to the Eyes, darkens the Sight thereof; or, as some concave Glasses, which represent the Species of Things to the Eye, not as they are in themselves, but with those Inversions, Crookedness, and Wrestings, which the Indisposition of the Glass frameth unto them. So likewise the Understanding being once invaded by Passion, judgeth not of Things according to their Natural, and naked Truth, but according as it finds them bear in the Fancy those Impressions of Pleasure, which are most agreeable to our corrupt Nature. Another Reason is, the Love of our Ease. For every Man, tho' he can be content to delight in the Pleasure of a corrupt Passion, yet that Part of it, which hath the Sting in it, which pricketh and pierceth, is unpleasant: And therefore there is required the Hand of Reason, by Apologies, Pleadings and Pretences, either to mollify the Passion, that it shall not pierce, or harden, or arm the Subject, that it shall not suffer. And besides, all this Excæcation of the Passions may be seen in the Practice of Hereticks, whose Custom it ever was, *Prius persuadere, quam docere*, to creep upon the

Ethic. lib.
6. c. 5. &
cap. 12. &
lib. 7. c. 8.

Affections of Men, and get Footing there, before ever they would adventure the Entertainment of their false Doctrines. For when silly and unstable Minds shall be once brought to such a Prejudice, as to have their Lives and Persons in Admiration; when they shall see an Impostor come to them as a Person that had utterly renounced the World, and cloathed with Poverty, and Repentance, drawing in and out his Breath with no other Motions than Sighings, bringing nothing with him but the plentiful Promises of Salvation, Tears in his Eyes, Oil and Honey in his Mouth, and the most exquisite Picture, without any Life at all, of true Holiness, which it is possible for the Art and Hypocrisy of Man's Invention to draw out, how can the Understanding chuse (especially being framed before unto Belief, by those too credulous Qualities, Ignorance and Fear) but be inclinable, and prepared to receive whatsoever Doctrines those subtle and hidden Murtherers shall administer unto them.

The second Effect is, Alienation, or withdrawing of Reason; that when it cannot so far prevail, as to blind and seduce Reason, by getting the Allow-

ance,

ance, and affirmative Consent thereof, it may yet at least so far inveigle it, as to with-hold it from any negative Determination, and to drive the Mind from a serious and impartial Consideration of what Appetite pursueth, for fear least it should be convinced of Evil, and so find less Sweetness, than if it were suffered to run on in a free and uninterrupted Pursuit thereof. And this is the Reason of that affected and voluntary Ignorance (which St. Peter speaks of, This they are willingly ignorant of.) And this is that, which Aristotle calls *Ἀγνοία ἐκ θεασπίας*. an elected, or voluntary Ignorance, which, for their Security's Sake, Men nourish in themselves.

But then, Thirdly, If Reason be peremptorily resolved neither to be deluded, nor come over to the Patronage of Evil, nor diverted from the Knowledge of Good; then doth Passion strive to confound and distract the Apprehensions thereof, that they may not with any Firmness or Efficacy of Discourse endeavour to interrupt the Current of such irregular Motions. For as Things presented to the Mind solely and openly in the Nakedness and Simplicity of their own Truth, do gain a more firm Assent unto them, and a more fixt Intuition

tuition of them; so on the other Side those Things which come mixed, and troubled, dividing the Intention of the Mind, between Object and Passion, cannot obtain any settled, effectual, or satisfactory Resolution from the Discourses of Reason: They gain but half a Knowledge, not any distinct, clear, and applicative Apprehension of the Truth; but a confused, broken Conceit of Things in their Generality; not much unlike unto Night-talkers, or such like, who cannot be said to be thoroughly asleep, or perfectly awake, but to be in a middle Kind of inordinate Temper betwixt both: Or like Stage Players, their Discourse is never driven so far, as if it did belong to them; it is never thoroughly considered with an assuming, applying, concluding Conscience, but only lurks in the Habit and Root of Knowledge within, altogether choaked with the Mists of Passion.

The last is that other, which in the same Place Aristotle calls *Περὶ ἁγνείας*, Rashness, or Precipitance, which is the last, and most tyrannical Violence Passion useth, when, in Spight of Reason, it furiously constraineth the Will to determine and allow of any Thing, which it purposeth to put in Practice. For the Body, sometimes it produceth

too violent Dilation, sometimes too heavy Oppression of the Heart. The Scattering, the Collecting, the Confusion, the Retiring, or the like Perturbation of the Spirits. The Causes of all which, as impertinent to this Discourse, I refer to natural Philosophers, and Physicians, and now proceed to consider of some Particulars, according to their former Division.

Now the two fundamental Passions, are those of Love and Hatred ; of which in this precedent Method.

And first, concerning Love, we will touching the Antecedents thereof consider its Objects, and its Causes. Both which will *coincidere* and fall into one. Love then consists in a Kind of Expansion, or Egress of the Heart, and Spirits, to the Object loved, as to that whereby it is drawn and attracted. Now as in Nature, so in the Affections also, we may observe in the Objects a double Attraction. The first is, That natural and impressed Sympathy of Things, whereby one doth inwardly incline to an Union with the other, by Reason of some prime Qualities disposing the Subjects to that natural and ungoverned Friendship ; such is the Love between a Loadstone and Iron, and divers other meerly natural Things.

The

The other is, that common and more discernable Attraction, which every Thing receives from those Natures, or Places, whereon they were ordained, and are still directed by the Wisdom and Providence of the first Cause, &c. Which Attraction as in meerly natural Agents, God himself worketh for the Perfection, and Conservation of their Being: So in Man it is wrought by that reasonable Power, which God hath made his Vicegerent, as it were, and, (as I may so speak) the Ubiquitary Agent in all the Motions of Man's little World; which Soul as in its own Nature and Essence, so likewise in its Operations, and Powers, bears some Resemblance to the Creator, in directing, governing, and overseeing all our inferior Actions. To apply then those Proportions in Nature to the Affection of Love in Man we shall find, first a Secret, which I will call Natural; and next a Manifest, which I will call Moral and Discursive Attraction. The first of these is that natural Sympathy, wrought between the Affection and the Object, in the first Concurrence of them, without any Suspension of the Act, or further Inquiry after the Disposition of the Object, which comes immediately from the outward, Natural and sensitive

tive Virtues thereof; whether in Shape,
 Beauty, Motion, Speech, Behaviour, or
 the like: All which coming under the
 Sphere of Sense, I may call Judiciary-
 Physiognomy, which is not a bare De-
 light in the outward Qualities, but a
 further Presumption of the Judgment,
 concluding therehence a lovely Dispo-
 sition of that Soul, which animateth,
 and quickneth those Graces. And in-
 deed we may well ground some good
 Presumption of the Similitude in the
 Qualities of the Soul with those which
 are most obvious and constant in the
 Body, from the Love which is between
 the Body and Soul, far stronger than
 any natural Love whatsoever (since as
 Aristotle tells us) that Similitude and Re-
 semblance in the Properties, is the Ground
 of Love. And hence is that Speech of
 Solomon's; As in Water, Face answer-
 eth Face, so the Heart of Man, to Man.
 So strong and significant are those Cha-
 racters which are stamped on the Body
 by the Motions of the Soul. But yet
 herein tho' it be injurious for a Man
 out of too much Austerity of Mind to
 reject the Judgment of Sense, and re-
 belliously to quarrel with this Instinct;
 yet it is fit that in this Case, consider-
 ing the universal Deceitfulness of Things,
 and what a Divorce, Habit and Edu-
 cation,

Ethic.
 lib. 8.

tion, and Hypocrisy, &c. have wrought in many between the out and the inside of their Natures, we should bring a yielding and fearful Judgment, the Love of Bias, which may easily upon the Assurance and Warrant of Judgment alter it self. The first Motions of the Heart in the Love of any Friend should be *Motus trepidus*, like the Motion of those Bodies, that are not fully fixed in their natural Place. But when a Friend, or any other Object, is thoroughly known to bear a Similitude with our Nature and Virtues, and by that Agreement, to be, as it were, a Man's Self, then may all our Motions and Affections tend thereunto, as unto the Center of Quiet and Repose. For as a Man's Self, so his Friend likewise, for the same Reason, may be the Center of his Thoughts and Affections. But here likewise we must observe that Proportion of Nature, that if our Affection cannot stand in Private towards the Good of any Friend in Private, without the Damage and Inconvenience of that Publick Body of which he is a Member, the Universal must be esteemed more dear and precious. A Scandal to the Body, and a Schism or Breach from the whole, is more offensive, more dan-

dangerous, more unnatural, than private Separation.

From this general and fundamental Cause of Love proceed divers others more special, whereof the first and principal is a Similitude between the thing loved, and that which is the Square and Rule of Love. Now the Rule and Square of Love (that we may not speak of Divine Love) is a Man's Self, or that Unity and Proportion which the Thing loved beareth to the Party loving. Which by Aristotle is called Ethic. lib. 8. c. 8. 9, 12. in one Place ἰσότης, in another ὁμοιότης, and elsewhere κοινανία, in another, ζαῖσότης. The Root then of every Man's Love unto himself is that Unity and Identity which he hath with himself; it being natural in every Thing to take Delight in the Simplicity of its own Goodness; because the more simple, and one, it is, the more it is like the Fountain of its Being, and therefore the more Perfection it hath in it. And this Love of Man unto himself, is, if subordinate to the Love of God, and governed thereby, *Debitum Naturæ*, a necessary Love; and Vid. Arist. Ethic. lib. 9. c. 4. & 8. such, as the Neglect thereof, is a Transgression against Nature. Now then as we Love our selves for Unity, which we have with our selves, so wheresoever we find any Union and Similitude, un-

to us, any Part of our selves, either in Nature, or Habits, upon that also do the Beams of this Passion extend. Now a Thing may represent our selves, either in Substance, or Nature ; as the Wife may be said to be a Part of the Husband, or the Children the Branches of the Parents, &c. Or else in Quality, or Accidents, as one Friend resembleth another in natural, and one Man another in habitual Qualities ; all which are then regular and good, when subordinate to that greater, our Love of God, and when governed by the Dictates of a rightly informed Reason, which amongst many others are these three.

First, That our Love carry its right Report, and no Sinister, and bye End, with it. That we love a Friend for himself, and all other Things for those Reasons, which are natural and good, without any indirect Reference solely to our own Benefit. *Hominum Charitas* (says Tully) *Gratuita est*. True Love is Free, without Self-respects ; but to shrowd our own private Commodity under the Name of Friendship, *Non est Amicitia, sed Mercatura* ; is only a politick and covered Merchandise ; for our own Profit, no intire and just Affection. Secondly, That our Love be not erroneous and prejudicial to draw the

the Mind so far into an honourable Esteem of a Man's Person and Parts, as that thereby those Weaknesses, and Imperfections (which are fastned unto every Man, that he may not be acquainted with his own Emptiness, with his Dependance on Divine Bounty, and with his necessary Use of Mens Society) may not be presented in such false Appearances unto us, as may work, First, an Opinion of their Goodness; and next, an unhappy Diligence in the Emulation of them. Thirdly, That our Love keep in all the Kinds thereof, its due Proportion, both for the Nature of them, [(it being in some, a Love of Reverence; in others, of Fellowship; in others, of Compassion; and the like,) as also for their several Distances in Degrees of Intention, which are to be more or less, according to the natural, moral, or divine Obligations, we find in the loved Person.

Another subordinate, and less Principal of Love, may be Love it self; (I mean in another Man,) for as it is natural, according to Aristotle to Praise, so sure it is natural and necessary to Love *mandesius*, Men of loving and good Natures. And herein is that verified, that Love is as strong as Death. For as it is one common and good Office of

of Death to take away all Envy, and Emulation between those, whose Lives were full of Opposition, (for it is noted as a prodigious Hatred between those Two emulous Brothers, (*nec furis post fata modus, flammaque Rebelles Seditione Rogi*) Even so likewise Love hath a Kind of coactive and constraining Power to draw and reconcile unto it self the most repugnant and differing Affection. For being of a transient Nature, and going forth, or transporting it self into the Person beloved, it cannot chuse but (according to the Condition of all natural Agents) work resemblable and like Affections unto it self. For besides that hereby an Adversary is convinced of injurious nourishing and detaining of Enmity, he is moreover mollified, and invited to a mutual Exercise of Love. It being as necessary to repay, as it is odious to hate a Friend. And this is the Occasion of those Words of Solomon, Thou shalt heap Coals of Fire on his Head, which, tho' perhaps with earthly and ignoble Minds it hath the Property of hardning them in their Hatred, yet with Minds ingenuous, and of any worth, or value, it hath a clean contrary Effect, to melt, separate, and purge it from the Dross of those

Prov. 25.
21.

those corrupt Affections, wherewith before it was polluted.

The next two Causes I will join in one; Namely, Absence from, and Presence with, the Thing loved; both which, in a different Respect do exercise Love; and therefore, First, I like not absolutely that Speech of Aristotle Ethic. lib. 8. c. 5. (unless he mean it of the transient Actions) that though Distance of Place do not dissolve the Root and Habit, yet it doth the Exercise of Love. For in the Mind of Man (as natural Bodies in the Respect of the Place,) there issues not only a Love of Delight in the Fruition, but also a Love of Desire in the Privation of their Good. And it is indeed the Miracle of Love, *συναγαμῆν* & *συνδεῖν*, to collect and knit together in one, Things far separated from each other. And herein also Divine Love hath the same Prerogative with Divine Faith; That as This, is the Being, Subistence or Possession of Things to come, and distant in Time; so That, is the Union and knitting of Things Absent, and Distant in Place; but much more then (even according to Aristotle, in the same Place) doth Presence to the Goodness of an Object loved, increase, and exercise our Love, because it gives us a more compleat Sight and Union

to

to the Excellency of the Object loved,
 1 John. 4. and therefore St. John speaks of a Per-
 18. fection, and St. Paul of a Perpetuity of
 1 Cor. 13. our Love unto God, grounded on the
 8. Fullness of his Vision, which we shall
 enjoy for Ever with Him, which being
 now but *per speculum, & in enigmate*,
 makes us, as to know, so likewise for
 1 Cor. 2. 8. to love but in Part only. If they had
 known, they would not have crucified
 the Lord of Life. Their Ignorance, and
 their Hatred went together, *Simul ut*
 2 Tim. 2. *desinunt ignorare, cessant & odisse*. And
 19. indeed in the Scripture, Knowledge and
 Mat. 7. 23. Love are identical, and the most in-
 Job 9. 21. ward Work of conjugal Affection is
 Psal. 1. 6. called Knowledge. Now as it is with
 Psal. 33. living Creatures, so it is with the Af-
 18. fections; they are nourished many
 Rom. 8. Times, and sustained after the same
 29. Manner as they were produced. But
 Gen. 4. 1. it is plain that all Love proceedeth
 from Knowledge, and all Knowledge
 pre-supposes some Presence of the Things
 known, either a Presence by Report,
 and Revelation, which is a Knowledge
 of Faith; or by immediate Represen-
 tation of the Thing it self, which work-
 eth a Knowledge of Vision. Presence
 then of the Object begetteth, and there-
 fore, according to my first Consequence,
 it nourisheth this Affection. Another
 Cause

Cause may be an Aggregate of divers Qualifications in the Object, as Simplicity, Ingenuity, &c. which Aristotle in Aristot. Rhet. lib. 2. c. 4. his Rhetorick hath touched. But I proceed to the Consequents, and Effects of this Passion; whereof the first may be Union, and a knitting together of the Thing loved, with the Party loving. And hence it is, that in this Life none are said to love God, but that are united to Him; And therefore as God's first Love to Man was Ephes. 2. 12. in making Man like unto Himself; so his second great Love, was in making Himself like Man, &c. But the Wicked, Rev. 22. 15. they are all *Asæi, & Alieni*; and *extra*, and *procul*, all Arguments of Separation, and by Consequence of Hatred. Now that I make Union an Effect of Love, I mean no other Union than that of Similitude, and Conformity, a mutual Consonancy in the same Motions, Inclinations, Desires, and withal some Kind of Endeavor (if I may so speak) of real Union, seen in the Embracings, Kissings, in the Exitiency, and Egress of the Spirits, in the Discovery, and Expansion of the Heart and Thoughts, in the Simplicity of the Demeanours, and generally in all other mutual Carriages. Love hath, in Moral and Divine Things, the same Effect, that Fire

hath in Natural, a congregating of Homogeneousals, and a separating of Heterogeneousals: So we see in the Love of God, the deeper and more earnest that is, the more is the spiritual Part of Man elevate and remote from the earthly. And therefore in Heaven, where Love shall be present, all Things shall be harmonious and homogeneous, I mean not in Essence and Nature, but in a pure and unmixed Spirituality of Affections, in a perfect Conformity of sincere and holy Desires. From this Union ariseth another Effect, a Rest and Satisfaction in the Mind, in the Thing United, which can only be total, and perfect in the Union of the Soul with * God, the greatest Good thereof. But proportionably there ariseth from the Union unto any other Objects of Love, a satiating of the Power; which is only then good and regular, when the Object is natural, and the Action limited. Disproportion and Enormity are the two Corruptions in this Effect.

A third Effect, which I will observe of Love, is the Stay and Immoration

* But here Gerson is faulty in applying the Three-Fold Appetite to the Trinity.

of the Mind on one Object, with an alienating of it from all other. Love and Knowledge have a mutual sharpening each of the other; For, as Knowledge doth generate Love, so doth Love nourish, and exercise Knowledge. The Heart and Treasure can seldom be severed; the Eagles will always resort to the Body; David's Love gave Length and Perpetuity to his Meditation, even all the Day long. And herein methinks may consist another Proportion of the Strength of Love with Death; for as this doth naturally collect and draw in those Spirits, which before lay scattered in the outward Parts, to guard, as it were, and arm the Heart in its great Conflict, with that last, that grisly Enemy, which it must then sustain, uniting all those weak and languishing Forces, which Nature hath to testify the natural Love which each living Creature beareth to its own Conservation; so doth Love draw and unite all those Spirits of the Body, which any Way administer either to the Fancy or Appetite, to serve only for the nourishing that Affection for the Vision of that Treasure, whereunto the Heart it self is already attracted. And this is the Reason of that proverbial Speech, *Amar*

est otiosorum negotium; that Love hath this strange Property in it; to make a Man ever idle, and yet never without Motion and Employment; ever idle, by alienating it from other; ever imployed, by fixing it on its own Objects.

Another Effect which is observed of of Love, is, Jealousy, or Zeal; whereby is not meant that suspicious, inquiring, quick sighted Quality, of finding out the Blemishes, and discovering the
 1 Cor. 13. Blots and Imperfections of a Friend: But only a provident and solicitous Fear, lest some or other Evil should either violate the Security, or blemish the Goodness of whom we Love, like Penelope in the Poet, *In te fingebar violentos Troas ituros*, &c. And the Reason is that sweet Communion and Sympathy between Lovers, that mutual Incorporation, as it were, of each into the other, whereby the Wounds and Stains of the one, do redound to the Grief and Shame of the other. He that is not jealous for the Credit and Security of what he pretendeth Affection to, loves Nothing but himself, in those Pretences. If a Pharisee bestow his Alms, not out of a Fellow-feeling of his Wants, whom he succoureth, but that he may be seen of Men, he loveth
 not

not his Brother, but his own Sin: If a fiery Sophister pretend Affection only for this reserved Reason, *Quia magna est & prevalet*, he doth not love the Truth, but his Ambition. There is another Effect of this Passion, on the Body, which they call Liquefaction, or Languor, a Melting, as it were, and a Decay of Spirits, by Reason of that intensive fixing of them on the Person loved. Love is of all other the most inmost and visceral Affection, and therefore the Work of it is called the *Bowels of Love*.

But, thus much it shall suffice me to have spoken of the fundamental Passion of all. The next in Order is Hatred, of which the Schools make two Kinds; an Hatred of Abomination, or Loathing, which consists in a pure Aver- sion from Something; and an Hatred of Enmity, which is not a flying, but a pursuing Hatred. I shall not distinctly speak of these two, but in general of the Dignities and Corruptions of this Passion. The Object then, of all Hatred is Evil, whether it be of Contrariety, Privation, Contradiction, or Relation; which howsoever in Respect of the Existence of it, it be, in some Cases, good, for the manifesting of the

the Glory of God, and the Trial of the Heart of Man, yet, as it worketh Deformity, Oppression and Disquiet of our Nature, it is against the created Law, of that inbred Love, which each Thing must bear unto its own Perfection, and by Consequence, is to be hated.

Besides this general and fundamental Cause, there may be others less general, whereof the first is, Fear. I mean not a submissive, reverend, obedient Fear, nor a Fear of Admiration; but a slavish Fear, a Fear of Terror, a Fear of Rebellion; now there is a double Root of this Fear; outward, and inward. The outward is that Cruelty, Oppression, &c. which we receive from the potent, and therefore unavoidable Malice of the Person hated. And herein Aversion and Loathing is not only allowable, but necessary and natural. But the inward Root is, the Guilt and Burthen of an unclean Conscience. Now, from this Fear ariseth a double Hatred. One, of a Man's own Conscience; because that is always affrighting the Mind with those Indictments, which it hath against it: The Worm of Conscience is of all Creatures most hateful; so that a wicked Man, when he once begins to know himself, loves every Thing, but
God,

God, better than himself. The other is against the Authors, and Executioners of Justice, of the Desert of whose Indignation we are from within convinced. Another particular Cause may be Disparity in Affections, and Desires; for notwithstanding there be many times Hatred, where there is Similitude (as sundry Men do use to hate their own Vices in others, being not content to have their Use, unless they have the Monopoly and Impropropriation of them) Yet this ever proceeds from some ensuing Inconveniencies, which are likely to follow therefrom. Now this Disparity sometimes is natural, in a secret Antipathy and Reluctation of Qualities; sometimes, moral; wherein we have our Aversion from the contrary Actions of other Men (if naught) secured. So that this Passion glances not from the Action to the Person, nor break out into the Desire of Disgrace and Overthrow of whom we hate, unless our own Credit lies at the Stake ready to be betrayed, if it be not prevented by the speedy Overthrow of those, whose unreclaimable Courses will ruin, or indanger it: Lastly, those Actions may be civil, and respect Society; and then, as the Opposition consists

lists in two Things, Opposition of Man's Hopes; and of his Parts; by crossing the one, and dis-esteeming the other. So Corruption may easily proceed from two violent and unreasonable Grounds, Ambition and Self-love; the one pursuing its Hope, the other reflecting upon its Worth. And to this particular may be reduced that Hatred which ariseth out of Parity, or out of a Corrivalty, or Emulation in the same, in the Arts or Pursuits, either by Reason of Covetousness, or Envy; a greedy Desire of our own, or a discontented Sight of another Man's Good. Affections very unfit for Society, when particular Love of Members to themselves shall prejudice the Love they should bear unto the whole.

The last Cause is a settled and permanent Intuition of the Object, a penetrating, jealous and interrupting Fancy. Because Evil being often viewed and thoroughly searched, doth generate an habitual and inveterate Detestation. First, because the After-Apprehension comes not simple, but with a forestalled Resolution of finding Evil therein. Secondly, it being in this, as in all other Discoveries, true, that the former Knowledge is a Master and Light unto the

the other latter. But light, fluent and wandring Fancies, tho' they be apprehensive of Injuries, and therefore liable to an oftner Anger: Yet by Reason of the Volubility of the Mind, joined with an Infirmary and Unexercise of Memory, are for this Cause less subject to a rooted Hatred.

I now proceed to the Consideration of this Passion in its Act. Now, there is a Four-fold Direction of the Quantity and Quality of our Hatred taken from the Object. 1. The Unalterableness of the Will, warrants the Inveterateness of our Hatred. 2dly, The Importunity and Insinuation of the Evil, warrants the Reiteration of it. 3dly, The Greatness exacts the Intention of it. 4thly, The Remission of it warrants the Moderation of it. We may instance for the Three former, in Sin; as for other Things, which Circumstances alter, they may be hated with a present, but not a customary Hatred, not a contemplative (as I may so speak) and perpetual Detestation. Sin is, of all other Evils, the most inseparable, pursuing, and active Enemy: Never here capable of an utter Overthrow, but still furnished with a continual Supply of Strength to oppose, with new Policies

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and

and Stratagems to circumvent, with an infinite Multitude of plausible Impostures, to insinuate into a Nature that is least armed and fenced against such Assaults. And therefore here only is that irreconcilable and multiplied Hatred necessary to be maintained. And now for the Greatness of Sin, which belongeth to the Intension of the Quality thereof; whether we consider it in its own Nature, as it is a Rebellion against the most absolute and perfect Will; or in its Effects, either in Regard of the Transcendency, and Diffusion of it, being a leprous and overspreading Pollution; or the Infiniteness of it both in Guilt, and in the Consequence of it, the Punishment of it; our Hatred cannot be too deep and implacable. Whereas in the prosecuting of other Evils with Hatred (being either so intense in their Nature, or not so diffusive in their Extension) it is a Matter of as great Difficulty to be right, as it is of Corruption and Deformity to miscarry. Of which, amongst many, I will note two. As, first, when a Man shall apply his Hatred of Prosecution against that Evil, which is the proper Object of Aversion. For some Things there
be.

he, whose Evil is only Conditional,
 which hurt not their Nature, but their
 Application; and these require a par-
 ticular Forbearance, and not any far-
 ther violating of their Nature. Se-
 condly, when the Passion is so Intense,
 that it cannot admit of any Admix-
 tion of Love, tho' the Object can ad-
 mit of some Admixture of Good: Or
 when the Hatred is absolute and ge-
 neral against only relative Evils. *v.g.*
 There is not any Man between whose
 natural Faculties and some Objects or
 other, there may not be discovered
 either an Insufficiency, or Reluctancy
 (and Aristotle gives a Reason) Now if ^{Ethic. lib.}
 in this Case he shall presently fall not ^{5. c. 5.}
 only into a relative and personal Ha-
 tred, but unto a professed villifying,
 unto an absolute and slanderous Op-
 position, to an Undervaluing and Con-
 tempt of Persons, led thereunto with a
 more particular Affection; or unto an
 open Desire of the not being thereof;
 he doth discover in the Degrees of his
 Hatred, a Corruption no less unrea-
 sonable than violent; it being almost
 all one, as if a blind Man should loath
 the Sun; or a deaf Man should wish
 all Tongues cut out. I hasten to the
 Consequents or Effects thereof, where-

of some are Good, which may be these.

First, Security against the Opposition of Evil. And therefore we shall observe in many Evils, that no Man is brought within the Danger, that is not at first drawn into the Love of them: All inordinate Corruptions then only wound the Soul, when they entangle the Will. Secondly, Confidence, or some good Presumption in our own, or assisting Strength, against the Evil. Both which Effects do proceed from a certain Covetousness and Furniture against the onset of Evil, which the Hatred thereof doth Cause. Thirdly, It worketh the same Manner of Victory, for *odium semper sequitur ex animi Elatione* (as Scaliger observes) which I think principally holds true in moral, and practick Courses, wherein this is a general Rule, He loves Evil that is overcome by it, whose Will is drawn to assent unto it. Perfect Hatred is strong and invincible, and hath that Property, which the Apostle giveth Love, to exclude all Fear. Fourthly, Now and then in respect of the Objects, it worketh Reformation: For as Countenance and Encouragement is the Fosterer, so Hatred and Contempt, is, as it were, Physick

sick to purge out an Evil. Opinion stamps Worth on many uncurrant Coins, which go, rather because they are received, than because they are warrantable. And therefore, if a Man naturally desirous of Reputation, see his Courses generally despised, he cannot so unnature himself, as still to feed on those Delights, which he perceives to provoke others unto Loathing and Contempt. For the bad Effects. First, observe Aristotle's Rule, That Hatred Rhet. lib. 2. c. 4. is, *ἡ ἐξ ὅλης γενεᾶς*, against the whole Generality of its Objects; so then all the Actions and Effects of this Passion are corrupt, which are not transcendent, but admit of private Reservations, and peculiar Indulgences; since there must needs be Irregularity, and a Depravation in that Act, which is conversant about an uniform and simple Object, to wit, Evil with a various and diverse Motion, as may be seen in Sin, in which that Man whose Hatred is not an universal and transcendent Hatred against every particular Evil, even those which his personal Relations make more peculiar unto him, if a Man still retains some privy Exceptions, some reserved and covered Delights, some Apologies, &c. Certain it is, his Hatred is either blind

blind in not seeing, or lame in not escaping his Bosom and retired Evils. Or is it rather indeed a personated than a true Hatred; rather a Meteor of the Brain, than a Passion of the Mind. A second Effect is rather Incredulity in not giving Credit to those good Reports which an Enemy obtaineth, or Envy or Malignity at the Sight of them. For such is the Condition of rankerous and swelling Conditions, as of raw and swelling Wounds, which by Reason of the Quickness of its own Pain, does as much abhor the Goodness of a Surgeon's Hand, as the good Offices of an Enemy's Sword. So is it with malicious Minds; they are tormented with nothing more than the Person of an Enemy: They can equally draw Nourishment to this their Passion, from the Good and Ill of whom they hate; yea commonly greater too, from the Good, than from the Evil, for, *odiorum acriores Causa quando iniqua*. Tacitus observes this between Domitian and Agricola. When Hatred is built upon a bad Foundation it commonly raiseth it self higher; and the Reason is, because in such Passions the less we have from the Object, the more we have from our selves, and what is defective to make up our

Hatred

Hatred in his Desert, is supplied by the Rising and Tumour of our own Stomachs. As we see in the Body, that thin and empty Nourishment will often swell it higher, than that which is Massy and Material. And here observe the mutual Offices which corrupt Affections exercise amongst themselves. Hatred first generates Envy, and this again doth reciprocally increase Hatred, and both join in a Conspiracy by so much more dangerous to that Soul, wherein they lurk, than to the Enemy, whom they rage against; and by much they are more near, inward, and hurtful thereunto. For certainly a venomous and murdering Quality is the most mischievous, where it toucheth closest. And from this ariseth that *Emphaxia*, a Rejoycing at the Miseries and Ruin that befalls an Enemy. But I proceed,

Another Effect is a sinister and crooked Suspicion, whereby we search with a prejudicial and envious Eye the Actions and Purposes of our Enemies; and according as the Sharpness of our Wits, or the Custom of our own Practices, we attribute unto them such Ends, as is likely were never framed, but in the Forge of our own Brains. It is reckoned up as One of those noble Attributes of
Love,

that it thinketh no Evil; And certainly there is not a more black and hellish Subtilty of Hatred, than that which can collect out of every Action some close Impiety, and pierce into the reserved and hidden Passages of the Heart: (And therefore Agripina that she might not discover any Hatred to Nero, would not acknowledge the Mischief intended her to be directed from him) Like that Man in Aristotle, who thought wheresoever he went, he saw his own Picture walk before him. And indeed all such Suspicion proceeds from some Hatred or other. For, as to think the worst of our own Actions, and to fear the Goodness of them, is a Sign of Hatred to our own Sins, so to have the Humour of casting the worst Glosses on other Mens Lives, argues a great Hatred to their Persons; But here is a Difference; we search for Evil in our selves to expel it; but we search for Evil in another to find it.

Another Effect is a proud and haughty Carriage, wherewith we contemn the Worth of another Person: There is a *Tumor Cordis*, as well as *Tumor Cerebri*: It is not only Knowledge puffeth up; there is as well a stubborn, as a learned Pride

Pride against the Person, as against the Weakness of our Brother, a Pride whereby we will not yield to a Stooping and Reconciliation with him, as whereby we will not stoop to the Capacity and Edification of him. Hence Aristotle Rhet. libi 2. c. 4. observes that Hatred, when it is simple, and alone, is without Grief, and I take it to be, because all Grief comes from the Hapening of some Evil; if to others, then it is the Effect of Love; if to our selves, then it would cause Humility, neither of which Attributes are compatible with Hatred, whose Property is to conceive in it self such Worth, as may draw it to an insolent Disesteem and Contempt of another Man. The last Effect is Impatience, and Fury in the Prosecution of an Enemy's Ruin, and therefore that worthy Effect of Love, contrary to this, is called *Μακροθυμία*, *Longanimitas*, Long-suffering. But Hatred is of a fierce and pursuing Nature, so far from admitting any Peace, or yielding to Condition of Parley, that it rests not satisfied with the Miseries, but desires the very utter Overthrow of an Enemy. For this is the Difference that Aristotle makes between Anger and Hatred, that the one only prosecutes Retaliation, the other, the

Annihilation of the Subject of its Revenge.

The next Passions to these Two, are Desire and Abomination. Of which I will speak briefly, only propounding two or three Rules, which may set out the Dignities thereof; since they differ only in Act and Habit from Love and Hatred; or as a Man sitting, from a Man walking. The first Rule is that, concerning Objects of an inferior and transitory Nature, our Desires be neither hasty nor precipitate, nor vast and unlimited. And in Matters of higher and more necessary Condition, that they be not either wavering and interrupted Desires, or negligent and unexercised Desires. For the first, we know the Nature of all sublunary and earthly Goods, they have all Something of the Serpent in them to deceive.

The Way of Riches and Profit is a thorny Way; the Way of Ambition, a slippery Way; and the Way of Learning an intricate and involved Way: And certainly he had need of better Eyes, than a blind Passion affords, that in so ill Ground, will make good Haste and good Speed together. In *Labyrin-
tho properantes ipsa velocitas implicat.*

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He is not the likeliest Man to get out of a Maze, that runs fastest. An over-nimble Desire is like the Stomach of a sick Man newly recovered, more greedy than Strong, and fuller of Appetite than Digestion; whence come raw and unconcocted Counsels; blind and ungoverned Resolutions. We never have the Patience to inquire after the right Way to our desired-End; it being the Suspicion of our Greediness, that the true Means are commonly the most tedious, and that Honesty, for the most Part, goes the farthest Way about.

For the second Rule; it seems necessary for many Reasons. First, for the Unnaturalness of it; because a restless and unsatisfied Desire is there only requisite, where the Object thereof is ordained to accomplish and perfect Man's Nature; not there, where it is a Means for his Benefit and Comfort only. 'Tis then a corrupt Desire that proceeds not from our Want, but our Vice, as that is not a natural Thirst, but an Inflammation and Distemper of the Body, which cannot be satisfied. Secondly, it worketh Anxiety and Perturbation of the Mind, and is no more likely to be a true Means to

Sen. de
Benef.
lib. 3.

lead us unto some farther Good, than a misty troubled Way and uncouth is, to bring a Man to his Place of Abode. Thirdly, It doth distract our nobler Cares; Martha's *Sollicita*, and Mary's *Necessarium* can hardly be found in the same Affection. Fourthly, they make a Man unthankful in receiving of any Favours from another; For saith Seneca, *Caduca Memoria futuro imminentium*; it is a strong Presumption that he seldom looks back upon what is past, that is earnest in the Pursuit of Something to come; and next, though he should look back, yet the Consideration first, of such a Benefit would be but slight and vanishing: For the Mind finding present Content in the Liberty of a roving and unbounded Passion, is marvellous unwilling to give permanent Entertainment to Thoughts of another Nature. And tho' this likewise were granted, yet, secondly, such Thoughts would rather be Thoughts of Murmuring and Undervaluing, than of Thankfulness: Every Man being willing rather to think ill of another's Bounty, than of his own Passion; and to conceive the Gift rather small and unworthy, than to acknowledge the insatiable

insatiable Vastness of our own Desires.

The next Rule observed, did respect those higher and more glorious Objects of Man's Felicity, wherein our Desires must be resolute, full of Quickness and Perseverance. The true Desires of this Nature, are described by the most pathetical and strong Similitude which Nature affords us; by Hunger and Thirst, and those not common neither, but by the Braying of a tired Hart after the Rivers of Water, and the Gaping of dry Ground, after the Sweetness of a seasonable Shower: And the Reasons are, First, because we are but poor and shallow Vessels, and those Passages are quite shut up, by which we should give Admittance to the Matter of our true Happiness; yea so full are they already of those rebellious Passions, that struggle and fight with any Thing of a contrary Nature which is entertained, as that our greatest Vehemency will not be sufficient either to empty, or to fill our selves.

The last Rule was that they should not be faint and sluggish, but industrious and painful, both for the avoiding Oppositions, and discreet applying of the
Furthe-

Furtherances required thereunto. And indeed, that is no true, that is no operative Desire. Children may wish for Mountains of Gold. Balaam may wish for a blessed Departure, and an Atheist may wish for a Soul as earthy in Substance, as Affection. But these are Ejaculations rather of a speculative Fancy, than of a working Passion.

The next Passions belonging to the concupiscible Faculty, are those which are wrought by the Presence and Union of an Object. And that is, when either we by our Desires have reached the Object, and then it causeth Joy and Delight, or when in our Flight the Object hath overtaken us, and then it causeth Grief: Passions which bear the most inward Relation unto all our Actions. Now these Passions are divers, according to the Diversity of their Objects. If their Object be sensitive or bodily, the Delight is called, *Voluptas*, Pleasure; if Divine, *Gaudium*, Joy; and so for Grief; if its Object be the Body, it is Pain; if the Soul, it is Grief.

First, then for Delight, (not to speak of it according to those several Considerations of it, but confusedly) The Object may be said to be, whatsoever is,

is, either medicinal for the Repairing, or natural for the Conserving, or any way accidental for the Advancing of a Creature : Other Things which eat out and undermine Nature, may happily yield some Measure of vanishing Content to Minds that taste every Thing with an erroneous and corrupted Palate. And therefore Seneca is bold to find Fault with Virgil's Epithet of *Mala Gaudia*, Joys, which issue from a polluted Fountain as not having in them that inseparable Attribute of an absolute Delight, which is to be invariable. But of the true Objects of Delight, some are sensitive and Corporeal, such as repair decaying Nature, and in this Kind there often happens a double Corruption; *viz.* an unnatural Delight, and an unlimited : Other Objects there are, which leave the Body, and belong to the Soul ; and they are both the moral and contemplative Actions of the Mind ; all which, because they are the Catalogue of Things under the Sun, are never without Vexations and Vanities. And therefore there are more divine Contemplations, which bring with them a satiating Joy, a Joy unspeakable, a Peace past Understanding. Nor does this Property of

Seneca.
Epist. 59.
over.

overflowing and swallowing the Mind, add any Degrees of Offence and Anxiety to the Soul; for it is not the Weakness of the Soul, as it is of the Body, to receive Annoyance by that which it delighteth in; nor does the Mind desire to subdue and conquer, but only to be united with, and, if it were possible, to be incorporated into its Object: And here, the only Corruption is the Deficiency of it; for though this blessed Light leave not any Man in the Shadow of Death, yet it takes us not quite out of the Shadow of Sin; yet at least our Endeavours must be, that though our Joy cannot be a true replenishing Joy, yet it may be an operative Joy.

Other more particular Causes of Delight than the Object, are all those that have Power any Way to make present the Object to the Faculty; And this is done three Manner of Ways, by Contemplation, by Confidence, by Fruition.

Contemplation adds unto the Soul a double Delight: First, from its own Propriety, it being the peculiar and natural Agitation of Man's Mind, and exercising of those Powers, whose Felicity consists in Working; Insomuch that

that those Things, which we abhor to know experimentally, our curious and contemplative Nature desires to know speculatively: And therefore the Devil's first Temptation was drawn from the Knowledge as well of Evil, as Good. But then, Secondly, Contemplation, in that Object of true Happiness and Delight, affordeth farther Joy, in that it doth, in some Sort, præ-unite Souls and Happiness together. And this is the Reason why Aristotle prefers contemplative Knowledge before practick. For tho' This, in Respect of its shedding it self upon Society, and its immediate Reference unto Communion, be of a perfecter Nature, yet certainly, in that Sweetness of Content, that Serenity and Brightness of Mind, that Exaltation of Nature, which we receive from those noble Motions of the higher Mind, the Other doth far, in Pleasure and Satisfaction, surpass all active Happiness. And therefore in the Body the Parts of Vision are before those of Action; the right Eye, before the right Hand. Thus we may observe in God (tho' there can be no Accession, nor Intermision of Delight, yet by Anthropopathy to us-ward) He did not so much Joy in his *Fiat*, as his *Vidit*; not so much when

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he gave his Creatures Nature, as when he saw their Goodness; Nature being the Object of Power, but Goodness, of Delight. But in this Delight, notwithstanding its Excellency, there may be a Corruption in the Excess thereof. For tho' it be true what Seneca saith, that *Corpus est pondus & pena anima*, yet for the Soul to attempt Liberty, and, as he speaks, by a continual wandering Speculation, *subducere se Custodia in qua tenetur*, to deny Assistance to, or forbid the Employments of the Body, is a Practice beyond its Commission, and comes within the Compass of Contempt, Neglect or Malignity; so that to separate these two, (as Hermits with their vowed Sequestration do) is as wicked in Religion, as it is monstrous in Nature, to see a Fire burn without Light, or shine without Heat.

A second Cause is sure Confidence of the Mind; so that whatsoever doth encourage Hope, doth therewithal strengthen and enlarge Delight. *Spes* Rhet. lib. *antes gaudent*, saith Aristotle; for where
1. c. 11, 12. Hope is strong, there is both an Alienation of the Mind from all our present Wants and Oppressions, and withal a Tranquility thereof in the Sight of future Good. But here we must take heed

need of deep Corruption in our Delight, that we have no ungrounded Confidence, and partly out of Presumption, partly from Security, to resolve upon uncertain and casual Events. A presumptuous Delight, tho' it may for the Time minister great Content, yet in the End, if it miscarry, will work heavy Inconveniences. For the Mind being puffed up with a windy and un-nourishing Comfort, is quite disabled for bearing the sudden Assault of an Evil, as having its Forces scattered by Security, which Fear and Caution would have collected. For we know, in Bodies, Union strengthens natural Motions, and weakneth violent; so likewise in the Mind, the Collection and Uniting of our Endeavours, doth both enable the Mind for the Prosecution of its own Ends, and resisting all Oppositions.

A last and proper Cause of Delight, is Fruition of Good, and the real Union thereof unto the Mind; And therefore in Matter of Pleasure and Joy, the more the Union is, the more is the Delight: Thus we see the Presence of a Friend yields more Content, than his Absence, and the Embraces more than his Presence; so in the outward

Delights, those of Incorporation are greater, than those of Adhesion, as it is more natural to delight in our Meats, than in our Garments. In the Understanding likewise, those Assents which are most clear, are most pleasant ; and Perspicuity argues the perfecter Union of the Object with the Power : And therefore we have those two, *Speculum & Enigma* put together by St. Paul ; where the Obscurity of our Knowledge of God is attributed unto this, that we see him not, *Facie ad faciem*, with an immediate Union, but his Image only at a Distance, and in these three Glasses ; *In speculo Verbi, Filij, Mundi* ; the last of Nature, and the two first of Faith.

The chief Effect of this Passion is an Opening and Dilatation of the Heart, and other Parts ; a Lightness of Body, with a clear and uncontracted Countenance expressing the Serenity of the Mind, whence it hath the Name of *Laetitia*, a broad and spreading Passion. It hath an Exultation and Egress of the Spirits, discovering a Kind of Looseness of Nature in her Security, whereby every Part of the whole Man is made quick and active, doing many Things not out of a fore-determined Reso-

Resolution, but out of an Instinct and Power violently transporting the Mind, and violently drawing both it and the Body to a Neglect of themselves, and to a strong Expression of so powerful a Passion, *Nam gaudio Cogendi vis inest.* Joy hath its Co-action and Tyranny exercised on all the Parts of the Mind and Body; on That, by alienating from all other Objects; on This, by driving it into Motions, which Reason left alone, without the Heat of Passion, would not exercise. Insomuch that some are reported in a sudden Joy, by a too violent springing out of the Spirits, and Alteration in the Body, to have fallen Dead. And this Diffusion of the Spirits shews the Haste and Forwardness of Nature in striving, as it were, to meet her Object, and to make Way and Passage from its Entrance into her, if she be not fully possessed of it, and to expel and scatter all adverse Humours.

The opposite Passion to this of Delight, is Grief and Sorrow, which is either sensitive, or intellectual. Sensitive, is that Anguish and Distress, wherewith Nature groaneth under an invincible Violation of the Body. A Passion, in this Sense, little conducing to the Advancement of Nature; being always joined to some Measure

sure of Decay, but only, as it serves sometimes for the better fortifying it against the same or greater Evils. It being the Condition of corporal Delights by Custom to grow burthensome, so of Pain to become easy. The Intellectual, which is called a wounded Spirit, is so much certainly the more quick, and pungent and piercing, by how much a Spirit is more vital than a Body.

The Causes of this Passion are, whatsoever hath the Power to disturb the Mind by its Unity and Application unto it. There are two Conditions then, of the Object of Grief; That it must be evil, and present; Evil, and that not only formally in it self, but apprehensively to the Understanding; and therefore we see that many Things, which are in their Nature corrupt and deadly, yet out of a particular Distemper of the Mind, and Deceitfulness of the Evil, may prove pleasant thereunto: And this, I mean the misplacing, or the unjust suspending of it, is the chief Corruption of this Passion. The next Condition is, that it be present; and that is, either by Memory, and then it is called Repentance, or by Fancy or Suspicion, which is Anxiety of the Mind; or lastly, by Sense, which

I call Anguish; the first is *Dolor macula*, the second is *Dolor moras*; and the third is *Dolor laboris*.

For the first then, Nothing can properly and truly work Grief by the Ministry of the Memory, when the Object or Evil is long since past, but those Things which do withal stain our Nature, and work Impressions of permanent Deformity. For often it falls out that many Things which for the Time of their Continuance are irksome and heavy, prove yet afterwards the Occasion of greater Joy, *Sed hæc olim meminisse juvabit*. The Objects then, of our Repentance are not our passive but our active Evils; not the Evils of Suffering, but those of Doing. For the Memory of Afflictions past, represents unto us, Nature loosed and delivered, and should therefore so much the more increase our Joy, by how much Redemption, for the most Part, is a greater Blessing than Immunity.

Concerning Grief of Pre-occupation, which we assume by a suspicious Fear and Expectation of Evil, I know not what Worth it can have in it, unless perhaps this be one, that by fore-acustoming the Strength to Evil, it be
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more strengthened to stand under it ! For it is the Property of Custom and Acquaintance, not only to facilitate Evils, (to which purpose Seneca saith, *Perdidisti tot mala, si nondum misera esse didicisti*) but farther to work some Manner of Delight in Things at first troublesom and tedious; even so, that Contumacity and Perseverance in Grief doth so alter the Nature of it, *Ut fiat tandem infelicitis Animi voluptas Dolor*, saith Seneca. The last Presence of Grief was real, when some ponderous Evil, either of Affliction, or Sin doth bruise Man, even oftentimes in his tenderest Part, his Soul and Conscience. And in this I cannot find, considered merely in it self, any Dignity; yet in a relative Sense, in Consideration of the Ends and Effects, which it produceth, it may have some; whereof the principal good Effects are two, Fear and Suspicion. Care or Sollicitousness to avoid those Evils, whether active or passive, with which our Nature hath been stained or oppressed, and thence Experience hath taught them to hate, as the burnt Child, the Fire.

The evil Effects of Grief commonly follow the Excess of it; and they respect
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the Reason, the Will, and the Body. In the Reason, it distracts, works Irresolution and Weakness, drawing the main Streams of it to a dreadful Contemplation of its own Misery, rather than to a fruitful Discourse how to avoid it; for as the Motions of a wounded Body, so also the Discourses of a wounded Mind, are faint, uncertain and tottering. Secondly, It works in the Will, Despair. For it being the Property of Grief to condensate, and as it were, on all Sides, to besiege the Mind, the more violent the Passion is, the more obscure are the Passages out of it; so that the Mind is constrained, having no Object but its Pain, to reflect upon, to fall into Despair, and a fearful Contemplation of its own irrecoverable Estate, standing stupified and astonished at its own Misery. And from hence proceeds another Effect; Fury, Blasphemy, Execration, as we may see even in that Mirrour of Patience, Job himself. And lastly, In the Body it worketh such Obstructions of the Spirits, as cause Faintness, Melancholy, &c. This Passion of Grief is distributed into many other Kinds; as Grief of Sympathy, which is Mercy. Grief for another's Good, which is

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called Envy. Grief for our own Want of the Good, which another hath, which is Emulation; of all which to speak would be too tedious. (Vid. Aristot. Rhet. lib. 2. c. 8, 9, 10, 11.)

The next Rank and Series of Passions are those, which respect their Object as annexed unto some Degrees of Difficulty in the obtaining, and that is Hope; or the avoiding it, and that is Fear. By Hope I understand an earnest and strong Inclination unto some great Good, apprehended as possible to be obtained, though not with our own Strength, nor without some intervenient Difficulties.

Concerning the Object or fundamental Cause of Hope, it hath these three Conditions. 1. To be Future. 2. Possible. 3. A difficult Good. First, Future; for Good is the Object of our Sense; now, Hope is without Sight; but yet it will not hence follow, that the more a Man hath of the Presence of the Object, the less he hath of the Hope thereof. For indeed tho' Hope be quite abolished by the compleat Presence, yet it is increased by a partial Presence of its Object. And as in massy Bodies, tho' violent Motions be in the End weakest, as being farthest from

from the Strength that drove them, yet natural, are always swiftest towards the Center, as nearer approaching unto the Place that draws them. So in the Hopes of Man, tho' violent and groundless, prove weaker and weaker, yet those that are stayed, and natural are ever more strong when they have procured a larger Measure of Presence and Union to their Object.

Quo propius accedimus ad spem fruendi, eo impatientius caremus; That Fruition, which is joined with some Emptiness and Defect, must needs strengthen our Hopes, as arming them with a double Desire of Goodness, and of Uniformity. For it is the Nature of Good, to increase the Sense of the Remainders of Evil, so that though the Number of our Defects be lessened by the Increase of our Perfection, yet the Burthen and Molestation of them is increased; and therefore the more Possession we have of Good, the greater is our Weariness of Evil, and the more Nature feels her Defects, the more she desires her Restauration.

The next Condition is Possibility; For though the Will sometimes may be tickled with Impossibilities; yet no Hope can respect its Object under

that Apprehension, since Impossibility worketh two Passions most repugnant to this, Hatred and Despair. By the Way, Note, what Despair is Regular. I mean that, which drives us out of our selves, and stops the Passage for any presumptuous Opinion of our own Sufficiency to break through. But that Despair, which out of a groundless Incredulity to the Power, or Diffidence to the Goodness of a superior Agent, (especially in Things Divine) doth both defile and ruin Nature; defiles it, in that it conceiveth basely of God himself, in making our own Unworthiness more Omnipotent, than his Power, and more hurtful, than he is Good; and ruins, in that the Mind is thereby driven to Flight, and damnable Contempt of all natural Means of Recovery, and breaking through the Streights of an oppressed Conscience.

The last Condition, was Difficulty; in Respect of our Ability to perform it; And therefore Hope hath not only an Eye to *Bonum*, but to *Auxilium* too; no Man waits for that, which is absolutely in his own Power to bestow upon himself: For, *Omnis Expectatio est ab extrinseco*; so that herein all those Hopes are corrupt and foolish, which
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are grounded, either in Error concerning the Power, when we conceive that, which is impotent; of sufficient Strength to advance our Nature, or compass our Projects; or concerning the Will of others, when being ignorant thereof, with a dead Hope, we presume upon their Help without Ground and Warrant for such Confidence; whence ariseth a sluggish and careless Security, a Kind of Rest and Quiet, such as is that of a sleeping or dreaming Prisoner, which is rather Stupidity and Senselessness, than any true Peace. True Peace comes from a living Hope, grounded upon some Certainty and Knowledge, and which must have these two Properties in them; Tranquility and Serenity: Otherwise it is but like the Rest of *Mare Mortuum*, whose unmoveableness is not from Nature, but a Curse.

The Causes of Hope follow. Whereof the first is our own Want and Weakness put together; the one driving us to the Object, the other to the Means. For every created Substance, as it is by Nature indigent, so it is, by the same Nature, impotent likewise. But notwithstanding this Cause, the Subject now and then is driven into the quite

opposite Passion. And therefore I pro-
ceed.

The next Cause is Experience and Knowledge, both in the Nature of the Thing hoped for, and of the Means conducing to the Attainment thereof. For though it may fall out, that Ignorance of our own Strength, and others Opposition may in hot and eager Minds work Presumptions of Success, and an empty Hope (wherefore Aristotle ob-

Rhet. lib.

2. c. 12.

Ethic. lib.

3. c. 8.

serves young Men, and Drunken to be bold, by Reason of that adventitious Heat, by which they are made bold and opiniative) Even as on the other Side, Strength of Understanding and Accuteness, because he sees so far into the Object, works Diffidence, Slowness, and Irresolution (as Pliny observes Aristotle saith of old Men, they are

Plin. Epist. *Δυσίλωδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν*) Yet if we mark

lib. 4. 7.

Rhet. lib.

2. c. 13.

it, both the former of these proceed from some Opinion of Knowledge, as the latter doth from the Conceit of Ignorance. For there Aristotle saith, drunken Men are confident; *Quia putant se Superiores*; and of young Men, *Quia nulla civilis doctus*. And then those that have attained to some higher Pitch of Knowledge, and are withal sensible of their own natural Impotency; out
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of the Vastness of Distance, which erroneously and ignorantly they conceive to be between themselves and the End they frame unto themselves as weak Hopes, as they imagine, that conceive infinite Desires: And indeed generally, the more active and quick our Life, the more sensible it is of all noxious Qualities, Weaknesses and Defects thereof. So then properly, Knowledge and Experience is the true Cause of Hope. Now this Experience may be such, as either we our selves have had, or such as we have observed other Men to have. For the First; Nothing could more assure the Hopes of David of a good Issue in his Goliath Conflict, than the divine Assistance, which he formerly had against a Lyon and a Bear. Faith and Hope can make use of double Eyes, to look two Ways at once, both backward with the Eye of Memory upon Actions past, and forward with the Eye of Resolution and Courage upon second Encounters. The second is the applying of other Mens Examples and Successes to our present Advantage. For since the Nature of most Men, is like that of Flocks and Herds, to tread in one anothers Steps, (Presidents having the same precedency to Reason, which

which a true and living Guide on the Way hath to a Mercury's Finger; the one only pointing to, the other leading in the Way) It hath pleased Nature to make Man not only a moral, but a sociable Creature.: So that when the Reason of Precepts can in no wise further our Hopes to be good, they may be confirmed by the Sense of Examples. *Segnius irritant*, &c. as both bringing with them less Authority, and likewise inferring Discredit upon a sluggish and unnecessary Despair. It is true indeed God hath blessed some Men with a greater Excellency of Gifts than others, yet we are not to think that ever any was made (as of Cato Senior) *in convitium humani generis*. This being one End of Nature in framing Men of eminent Virtues, not only that we might wonder, but believe and know, that the same Things, which for their Greatness are the Objects of Admiration, may as well, for their Possibility, be the Object of our Hope.

The third Cause of Hope may be our own Goodness and Facility of Nature, whereby we finding a Readiness in our selves to further the Pursuits of another Man, may expect the like from others.

others. For it is observed by Aristotle Rhet. lib.
 1. of young Men, *sua ipsorum innocentia ceteros metiuntur*. 2. c. 12.
 They therefore, which are soft and facile to yield, are likewise to believe, and dare trust those, whom they are willing to pleasure. And indeed, that is the Rule of Nature, which makes a Man's Self the Pattern of whatsoever it hath made his Neighbour the Object.

The last Cause proceedeth hence, and that is, Credulity, in relying on those Promises which are made for the Furtherance thereof. And in these two last Causes, the chief Corruption is not, to let our Judgments come between them and our Hopes, otherwise, (if what Tacitus speaks in another Sense) *Fingunt creduntq;* if Facility feign Assistances, and our Credulity rely upon them, then will the Issue be that of Ixion's Hope, a Cloud for Juno. And therefore Aristotle out of an easiness to Hope, collects in young Men an easiness to be deceived.

The Effects of Hope follow. Whereof the first is, to free the Mind from all Anxieties, Suspensions and Demurrs, all which arise out of the Floating and Instability of the Mind, which indeed is a Dram of Despair, and therefore altogether

together incompatible with the opposite Passion: And herein Hope is well called an Anchor; for tho' there be but one Hope joined with Certainty, yet the rest having in them some ground for Fear, or Caution, this should be only a Fear of Covetousness, not of Diffidence. Because where there is a Distrust in the Means, there is, for the most Part, Weakness in the Action; and therefore Aristotle hath put Hope and Confidence together; *Ἐλπίς ἐστι ἀσφάλεια* *πὲρ τῶν μέσων*. A good Hope is ever grounded on Faith, and always worketh some Measure of Affiance in the Means unto it.

A second Effect is to work some Kinds of Distaste and Weariness in our present Condition. Now there is one Distaste, which ariseth out of Weakness, and another out of Want: That which Weakness produceth, is a sickle and inconstant Motion of the Mind, whereby it always desireth an Alteration of Estate, which is wrought, either thro' Impatience to undergo any Manner of Opposition in our Proceedings, whence the Mind, upon the first Difficulty, is frightened from its Pursuit; or out of a strange Sharpness of Apprehension, or Suspicion rather, which in-

ables

ables the Mind to discover Insufficiency in that, wherein it desireth to receive Content, or out of Curiosity and Search, when we suppose that those Things, which cannot in their Nature, may at least in their Variety and Number yield some Content; and, as united Sands, bring Weight and Satisfaction with them. But all this Distaste, which springeth from our Impotency, is not the Effect of Hope, but that which is grounded on our Emptiness and Wants: Whereupon followeth

The third Effect; An earnest Contentment in the Pursuit of that Good, which should fill up our Defects: And Rom. 10. 22. Gemitus Creaturæ. hence you may observe, that there is not any Passion, which doth so much imploy, or so little violate Reason, as this of Hope doth. It being an exciting Passion, and moving every Agent to his proper and speedy Operation, for the gaining its Perfection, which the Mind so earnestly breaths after, and the Want whereof doth work such Weariness in it.

The last; A contented Repose and Patience; and this Patience is three fold: A Patience for the Distance, and a Patience for the Difficulties in our desired Good. Hasty running Hopes are

as improper in their Nature, as they are commonly vain and empty in their Success.

The opposite Passion is Fear; which is a serious Aversion from some inclining and approaching Evil, apprehended as burthensom to our Nature, and not easily resistable by our Strength. It is an humbling and debasing Passion, which always implies some Manner of Servitude and Subjection, in whom it resideth: And therefore, the fundamental Cause of it may be our Weakness and Subjection, whereof the one implies a Disability in us, the other an Obligation and Necessity to undergo an Evil. So that Fear is a naked and disobedient Passion. For as Nakedness hath three evil Properties in it, viz. to disable for Defence, to expose to Injury, and, from both those, to work Shame in us, by the Consciousness of our own dejected Estate; so likewise Fear hath those two Roots (not Effects properly) to make us impotent and obnoxious; and from both, it infers that Shame, which cannot but follow the Apprehension of a double Baseness. For altho' Seneca saith, that *Rubor est Virtutis Color*, and therefore a Companion rather of Perfection than Weak-

Weakness; yet it is rather a Symptom of a Mind virtuously disposed, in declaring the quick Apprehension of its Lapses and Defects, than any necessary Adjunct to Virtue it self; it proceeding not from the Confidence and Strength, but from the Consciousness and Infirmary of Virtue, which hath this proper Effect to make the Mind more sharp Sighted and apprehensive of other Stains. So then, the Roots of this Passion, are Weakness and Subjection both together, and not otherwise. And therefore we see sundry Times, Strength shakes off the Yoke of Obedience, and instead of Homage, pays Violence and Rebellion; as we see not only in that civil Government of Men, but also in that natural Government of Creatures by Man, to whom by the Law of the Creation they were all made Subject; yet the Strength of many of them hath taught them to forget their original Bondage, and instead of fearing, to terrifie Man, their Lord. And whenever we tame any of them, this is not so much the Work of Supremacy, as of our Reason; and we are beholding therein to the working of our Wit, and not to the Prerogative of our Nature. And thus as

we

we see Strength, so likewise Immunity in the midst of Weakness takes away Fear. Whence we see good Men dare even defie Death, and insult and trample on the Grave, which they are even now about to enter; because, tho' by Reason of their Weakness they are not delivered from the Mouth of Death, yet they are from its Teeth, and Sting; tho' not from the Earth of the Grave, yet from the Hell of the Grave; tho' not from Sin, yet from the Malediction and Strength of Sin, the Law. Our Adversary must be strong, as well as our selves weak, if he look for Fear.

The Corruption then of this Passion in Relation to these Causes, is that which ariseth, either out of an Error of Humility in understanding our selves, or of Judgment and Suspicion in mistaking of others. There are some Men, who, (as the Orator speaks of despairing Wits) *De Viribus suis pessime merentur*; who are unthankful unto Nature, and deserve that Weakness, which they unjustly complain of. The Sight of these Mens Judgments is not unlike that of perspective Glasses, the two Ends whereof have a double Representation; the one fuller and nearer than

than it truly should be; the other smaller, and at a far greater Distance. So they look upon themselves with a distrustful and desperate Judgment, which represents every Thing remote and impotent; on others, with an over-reaching Judgment, which represents all Perfection too perfect.

The more casual Causes are, First, The Suddenness of an Evil, when it seizeth upon us, as it were in the Dark, and uncovered; for all Darkness, as well in Events, as Times, is dangerous, and comfortless; all Unacquaintance then of it must work Amazement, whilst Foresight either worketh Boldness to encounter it, or Patience to undergo it.

Ambiguarum Rerum sciens, eoque intrepidus. For, as the same Man speaketh, *Opportuni magnis Conatibus*, so also *Opportuni magnis Timoribus Transitus Rerum*. All Innovation in the moral, as well as in the politick, is dangerous, and therefore fearful. For as it is in the Wars of Men, so likewise in the Evils, these are more dangerous and terrible, which are by Way of Invasion, than those which are by Way of Battle. *Invadunt Urbem Somno Vinoque sepultam.*

Tacit. Ann.
nal. lib. 1.
Hist. lib. 1.

But

But here observe, that there is one Evil that sets upon us, *cum Furto*, another that sets upon us, *cum Pompa*, which, like Thunder, hurts not only with its Danger, but with its Noise, and presents unto our Eyes, as it were the compleat Furniture and Variety of all the Instruments of Terror. And both these being in their Extremity, are alike evil, and Occasions of a deadly Fear.

Another Cause is the Nearness of Evil; for as it is with the Objects of Sense in a Distance of Space, so is it with the Objects of Passion in the Distance of a coming Evil. A Remotion in either, the less it is, the greater it makes the Object present; and by Consequence the weaker is the Impression therefrom upon the Faculty; and the Reason is, because no Evil hurts us by a simple Apprehension of its Nature, but its Union with us, and Propinquity is a Degree of Union.

Another Cause is, the Newness of Evil, when neither the Mind it self hath had precedent Encounter. (*Magnitudinem rerum Consuetudo subducit*) whereby to judge of its own Strength, nor any Example of some prosperous Resistance heretofore; and the Reason

is,

is, because all Admiration is, in some Sort, a Kind of Fear; it being the Property of Man, not only to fear that which is against, but that also which is above our Nature, and that, not only with a Supposition of Power and Regency, but with a Supposition of Excellency and Victory, when the Faculty finds the Object too strong, and disproportioned thereunto. And therefore when any Evil shall at once burthen our Nature, and by its Novity pose our Understanding, it cannot but make our Fears the stronger, by how much Ignorance hath made our Reason weaker. Now the Corruption is, when (as Aristotle says of Anger, that it runs away from Reason with an half Message) the Object shall be pluck'd away from the Understanding with an half Judgment, with that broken Knowledge of Wonder, rather than with a serious Consideration of what Reference it beareth to, or Damage it is likely to bring upon our Nature.

Another Cause may be Conscience of Evil. For Wickedness, when it is condemn'd of its own Witness, is exceedingly timorous, and being press'd with Conscience always forecasteth terrible Things. So that every evil
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Man

Man hath a double Flight from God; a Flight from the Goodness, and a Flight from the Justice of his Will. All Sin is, like the Sea, very barren and fruitless, save in casting up Foam and Mire, the Shame and Froth of a tempestuous Mind; but I proceed to the Effects of this Passion.

The first may be Suspicion and Credulity of the Approach of any Evil.

Hist. lib. 4. *Retineri commectus dum timet credit*, saith Tacitus. And the Reasons may be, First, because the Nature of Man being subject unto infinite Dangers and Annoyances, hath therefore impress'd upon it a Wisdom of Providence to foresee those Evils, which cannot so easily be shifted off in their Onset, as they may at their Distance be prevented.

Pronæ ad Religio- nem per- cussæ se- mel men- tes. Hist. lib. 1. Again, In Fear, the Mind of Man is drawn to a nearer Sense of its own Impotency, and to a more prejudicate Opinion of the adverse Power, as if that were ready to oppress it. So that, as Tacitus saith, *Inclinatis ad Creandum*. So may I say too, *ad timendum animis loco omnium etiam Fortuna*. For as Cloth once died from its natural White, will take no other but a darker Colour; so Minds once steeped in the bitter Humours of this melan- cholly

cholly Passion, will seldom admit of any, but more black and fearful Con-
cepts.

Lastly, A Reason may be, that na-
tural Love, and by Consequence, Cre-
dit, which every Man yieldeth to his
own Thoughts and Presumptions,
whereby he will be easily induc'd to
believe whatever Fancy his ungathered
and distracted Mind can nourish; And
this Effect of Fear is generally in it
self a Corruption of it.

Another ill Effect, is Dislike and In-
credulity of those strengthening Means,
which Reason presenteth for the free-
ing thereof. Whence issue Inconstan-
cy and continual Change of Resolu-
tion, hating all Counsils when they
are present, and over-esteeming them
when they are too far past.

Providis Tacit. An-
consilia in incerto, & Timor etiam Auxil. nal. lib. 3,
lia reformidat. Curtius,
And the Reason is,
because this is a multiplying and genera-
tive Passion, ever producing Motions
of its own Nature. He which fears
Danger in another's Power, will easi-
ly fear Error, or Impotency in his own
Aids; and it is common with Men to
think themselves unwise, when they
feel themselves unhappy.

Again, It is the Property of Fear to make us to reflect upon our own Weakness. The transient and reflective Acts of the Understanding represent one the other, that whilst that, whereby we look upon others is stronger; this, whereby we look on our selves, is weaker. And this is here true, that the more we see of Danger from without, the less we have of inward Strength for Resistance.

A third ill Effect may be, a Weakening both of the Faculties of the Mind, and of the Spirits in the Body, whereby the one is made unfit for Search or Council, the other for Service or Execution. Not as if all the regular Motions of inferior Powers, did not serve to sharpen the Counsils and Projects of the higher, but it is to be understood of all Invasion only, and Tyranny: And then, as in the States of Polirick, so in Moral, and Self Commonwealths, there are three Ways to infer Weakness: One is Foreign Incurfion, and that is done by the Confusion and unserviceable Mixture of Passion and Reason: Another is, Civil Diffention; and that is the Tumult and Disorder of the Spirits, by this Motion. And the last is, an Emptiness and Dereliction in the Parts; and that

is

is here effected by the retiring of the Spirits into the capital City of the Heart, whereby the outward Parts are left weakened and unguarded; which tho' it be a strengthening of the better Part, is yet a Weakness of the major Part of Man.

The last Effect is useful, and that is, Care, Wisdom and Caution, in Use of the Means for our Preservation. For as, in the Scripture, *Timor Domini*, a Fear that is grounded on the Word of God; so in Morality a *Timor* grounded on the Word of Reason, is *Fons Sapientie*, and *Radix Viræ*, as Security is the only Root both of Negligence and Folly, Tacitus observes upon one of the wisest Policies that ever Tiberius did practice (that his writing to the Legions abroad, *tanquam adepto principatu*, when at home he us'd only Modesty and Refusals) that it was done, *ex Formidine*; so wise a Counsellor was his Passion to him.

The next Passion, and last, is Anger. I will not now sever this Passion, as Aristotle doth, in its several Degrees, viz. a sharp Anger; a bitter Anger; and an hard and knotty Anger. Nor, with St. Paul, as only differing in Degree, or in Order to the Constitution

Aristot.
Politic.
lib. 5. c. 8.

Ethic. 1. 4.

Eph. 4.

(110)

Situation of the Subject, or his divers Customs, Educations, or Habits; but, as in the rest, speak of the Causes, &c.

The fundamental Cause is Contempt from others joined with Love of our selves. Whether it be of Disesteem, which impeacheth his Notice; or a Disappointing of his Purposes, which crosseth his Success; or slandering, which spoileth his Credit; which if they be done by one, from whom we may hope to receive Revenge, works not only Anxiety and Grief, which is a Motion of Flight, but Hope also, and Desire to help it self, if not in the Recovery of its own Good, yet in the Comfort of another's Evil. For all Calamity is either legal, or malignant. *Cum suo Supplicio torquetur, quiescit animo.* When it feels it self, it presently proceeds, either by Course of Justice, or violent Revenge, to please it self with other Men's Evil. For the former Kind of Contempt, as it is the common Property of Man with all other Creatures, being *Animal Naturale*, to love himself; so also being *Animal Sociabile & Politicum*, to be loved of others: Because hereby that Love of himself, which proceedeth from Judgment

ment and Reason, is confirmed; for every Man doth more willingly believe that, whereunto he hath greater Authority to persuade himself: And therefore when a Man possessed with a Love of himself, or his Friends, shall find either of them slighted by those, from whose Judgments he hoped for Confirmation, thence not only ariseth a Grief, that his own Judgment is undervalued, and Expectation deceived; but an eager Desire of proving the contrary. Such Contemners are all those ungrateful Persons, who slight received Favours, and out of a swelling and high Stomach, cannot endure to acknowledge any Obligation; but desire to receive Benefits as Men, closely and behind their Backs; that so neither others nor their own Eye might be witness unto it. *Gratia oneri habetur.* Such is the Pride of some Men, that they cannot endure to be overcome, no not in Kindness: And therefore, *Ubi multa Beneficia antequamere, pro gratia, Odium redditur.* Which cannot but work double Anger: An Anger against our own Weakness, for the Choice of so unfit a Subject, and an Anger at that contemptuous Pride, which hath so basely entertained them.

Hither

Hither also we may refer those locked and close Men, who even to their Friends are so reserved, as if none were worthy, to whose Judgments or Trust they might commit themselves, and as if they put more Confidence in a Paper, than in a Friend.

The second Contempt adds to this, as being, not a slighting, a privative only, but a positive Injury, and an Assault of our Power; not an Opinion only, but an Oppression of our Weakness. A Course more likely to incense Nature, by how much the more, Opposition is more sensible in Motion, than in Rest. Methinks these two former Contempts, are like a Bank, and a Bridge, or Lock, to the Water; whereof the former doth only confine the Water, and not oppose it, as not hindering its Motion natural; (and to this we compare that Contempt of Disesteem) wherein we see not any manifest Tumults, but only a secret Swelling and Rising of the Water, which breaks not out into Outrage and Violence; but the later resisting the natural Course of the Stream in the Precipitancy of its own Channel, makes it sometimes, not only over-swell all the Sides, and so break through both Banks and Bridge; but in the mean Time, works

works in it great Tumult and Noise;
Spumens & fervens, & ab Obice savior
ibit; and to this I compare the la-
 ter, hindring of our Counsils and
 Actions.

But the last is the greatest, as not
 only dishonouring a Man in private
 and reserved Opinion, but in the Eyes
 and Ears of the World, not only by
 making him odious in his Life, but also
 in his Memory, and preserving the Rot-
 tennesse (if I may so speak) of his Name,
 beyond the Rottennesse of his Grave:
 And for this Reason, we can not but be
 so much the more incensed, by how
 much Perpetuity accumulates, either to
 Weakness or Perfection.

Other more accidental Causes there
 are, whereof some may be considered
ex parte patientis; others, *ex parte in-*
ferentis.

Touching the Patient, there are three
 Qualifications, which can make him
 more inclinable to Anger upon Supposi-
 tion of the Fundament.

The first is his Excellency, whether
 inward of Nature, or accidental of
 Fortune. For hereby Men are made
 jealous of their Credit, and Impatient
 of Abuse, as well perceiving, that all
 Injury infers some Impotency in the
 Patient;

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Patient, and of Excellency, at least concerted, in the Agent, as Aristotle says, *ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦ βίου καὶ ὑπερβόλῃς*, which cannot stand with the Height and Distance of him that is oppressed, even by his Superiors, much less his Equals, nor with his own good Opinion of himself. *Malet alta mente repositum Judicium Paridis*, &c. It wrought a deep Indignation in the Mind of Wisdom and Power to see a wanton Judgment give Beauty the Precedency in their Emulation.

The second is the Subject's Weakness, when the Mind finds it self most of all assaulted in those Things, wherein it is most deficient, which Aristotle hath observed, when he tells us, that sick Men, poor Men, and Lovers, are most subject to this Passion. It being as great a Pain, and greater Contempt, to rub and provoke an old Wound, than to make a new. And this Injury, which is exercised upon open and naked Creatures is more intollerable than the other : That proceeding only from Strife and Emulation, but This, from Insultation and Pride : The one, a Dis-esteem and Opinion only ; the other a Contumely and Exprobation. The one is a Conflict of Judgments, the other of Passions, and therefore likely to be the greater

greater. Again, those Men of whom Aristotle speaks, are most tender to feel an Injury, most suspicious to fear it, most interpreting to over-judge it. Lastly, to give a Reason of both those former Causes together, it is a frustrating of their Expectation, whilst Men of Worth and Excellency expect rather Approbation and Imitation, than Contempt; and Men weak and defective, expect Compassion to cover, and not Pride to mock, and so double their Wounds; and both of these are, in some Sort, Debts of Nature; it being the Law of Reason, to honour Merit, as it is the Law of Mercy, to cover Nakedness. And we may well conceive Anger will be strong, when it thinks it self lawful.

The last Quality of the Subject is, his suspicious, apprehensive and interpreting Fancy, ready to pick out Injury there, where it can not be found; And therefore Seneca speaks wisely; *Non vis esse iracundus? ne sis curiosus.* It is commonly seen in Matters of Censure and Suspicion, that the more, Sight and Reason goes out, the less abideth within. Nor is it hard for a Man possessed with this Opinion, that he is the common Subject of other Mens Con-

tempt, to find out either in the Defect of Nature, &c. some just Occasion of Exception, which yet being farther proved, will be rather Strangeness than Injury. And this is generally a Corruption of this Passion.

In Respect of the Agent, one is, his Baseness, which works a double Cause of Anger ; one, for an Injury of Omision, in neglecting Superiors ; another, for a positive Injury, for the Evils offered them. Secondly, Another Quality in the Agent, is, his Impudence in Words, or in Carriage ; for all Impudence carries with it Stiffness and Contentions, and Boldness, all which are Incitements to this Passion. For as Shame, being a Degree of Fear, worketh an Acknowledgment of our own Weakness, and, by Consequence, Lenity and Mercy ; so Impudence, in all Things contrary thereunto must likewise produce a contrary Effect. Again, those Things, which we do impudently, we do willingly : Now nothing does more aggravate the Wrong, than that it proceeds from the Will of Man, and of Reason, because Man's Power is in his Will ; and Passions are therefore more easily born withal, because they work ungrounded, and are our Imperfections,

not

not our Power. Again, to plenary, spontaneous Action, there are required Antecedent, Deliberation, Approbation, and Assent; and consequently, Resolution, Perseverance and Constancy; all which take away whatever is required to Lenity, as Confession and Repentance; and withal, add more unto the Injury; as an Action exercised by the whole Man, and implying a perfect Consent, and Unity of our selves thereunto, whilst other Passions, as they proceed from more Discord in our selves, so they produce less in other Men. Another Thing in the Agent, is, his near Relation, whether natural or moral, by Blood, or Friendship. And the Reason is, because our Expectation is disappointed; for in Union we did expect Sympathy, and not Discord. Secondly, Anger is a Kind of Divulsion of Things before joined. There therefore, where is the greatest Union, must needs be the strongest and the most violent Separation; As in the Body, the Divulsion of the Soul is more horrible, than of an Arm, or some other Member.

Another Cause is a too great Freedom and indiscreet Use of Speech, especially if it be Rebuke. Anger is by Nothing more nourish'd, than by
much

much Speaking ; tho' not in the Party speaking ; because Speech is to Anger, as Fear to Grief, a spending and venting of it. Lastly, another Cause is, Contention and Difference, whether it be in Opinions, or Inclinations ; because it is always joined with an Undervaluing of other Men's Choice, which on the one Side, or the other, if it be not seasoned with Sobriety and Moderation, will seem rather an Humour of Opposition, than Zeal to the Truth, wherewith many Men are so far possessed, that one must hardly dare to speak the Truth in their Company, lest they endanger it, and make themselves seem Heretical : So strongly do they delight in changing any Thing, tho' not in *Melius*, yet in *Aliud*. Like Chrysippus in Laertius, who used to boast that he wanted Opinions ; but those once gotten, he never wanted Arguments and Sophisms to defend them.

To conclude the Causes, we will shew it regularly in these Conditions. First, that it still observe Proportion and Conformity to the Rules of Love, otherwise it is not *Ira in Delictum*, but *Ira in Fratrem*. Secondly, That it keep Proportion unto a true and whole Judgment,

ment, lest it be unadvised. It must be true that is there and settled, both in Act of Interpretation, (and that reacheth to the Injury) and in the Act of Direction, (and that reacheth to the Passion). It must be whole both in due weighing the Intension and Remission of our Injury, not from the Nature of the Act, but from some Qualifications adjoined thereunto; and also in fully determining of the Act of Passion, not only inferring, *Quod sit*, lawful, but *quid sit*, in the Manner of it also. And this I take to be the proper Way of governing this Passion. But now I proceed to some Effects of Anger: They are such as are wrought in our selves or others: Those in our selves are outward in the Body, or inward, on Reason. Those on the Body are, Clamour, Inflammations, Fire in the Eyes, Paleness, &c. which I do not altogether mislike, as testifying our just Displeasure at an Offence received: For, though I would not have a Man in his Passion suffer Metamorphosis, and turn his Face into a Torment, punishing himself as much with the Disgrace as his Adversary with the Terror of his Ugliness; yet neither can I like that secret and unrevealed Anger, that Politick

Ethic. lib.
4. c. 3.

litick and stomach Anger, which closely shrowds it self under a clear Countenance, which being unnatural to this Passion (it being its Property, *Non infidari, sed palam agere*) will quickly degenerate into Malice and Rancor.

The inward Effect of this Passion is, to incite Reason to judge of the Wrong, and Means of Revenge, which is then corrupt, when done by Prepossession, Transporting, &c. which is to make Reason a Party, and not a Judge. In which ill Office, there is not any Passion more fruitful than Anger, both by Reason of its Suddenness and its Violence.

Ethic.
lib. 7.

The last Effect of Anger is Expedition and Dexterity, in executing the Means of our Satisfaction: But here is to be avoided one main Corruption. 1. Precipitancy, or Impatience of Delay, or Attendance on the Determination of right Reason: In which Relation, Aristotle compares it to an hasty Servant, that runs away with half his Errand.

The Effects of this Passion corrupting others, whether it be a mutual Provoking to Faction, or an Amendment of them, because they are impertinent to the Dignity and Corruption

ruption of this Passion, I let them pass.

And now let us proceed to the Dignities of Man's Soul, which are proper to it, in a more independent Consideration; and it may be gathered, either from the Consideration of the Whole, or the Parts thereof. The Whole hath many Dignities, and rare Excellencies comprized in it, under this Name of Divinity, which may be discovered in a twofold Respect; in Respect of its Original, and in Relation to its Nature.

*Tristitia
vultus
corrigitur
anima.*

I call its Original, Divine, not by any Transfusion of its Substance from God, as if it were some Portion or Practice of his Nature; but only because he concurs more immediately, powerfully, and totally in the framing thereof, than of any Form, or Nature; as infusing it into the Body, and creating it by his Power, without any Assistance of the Parents, save only to fit and prepare the Body for its Reception.

Concerning the Dignity of the Soul in its Nature and Essence, the very Light of Reason hath reached thus far, as to confess that the Soul of Man is, in some sort, a Spark or Beam of the

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Brightness

Brightness of a Deity And it is warranted by an Oracle more infallible, that it was breathed into him by God
 1 Cor. 11. himself, and was made *Secundum Imaginem & Similitudinem Dei*; and so truly
 17. and lively, that it is more notable in him, than in the whole World besides. Other Things are only *tanquam Opificium*, wherein is represented the Wisdom and Power of God; but Man, in his original Purity, besides that was *tanquam Cera*, wherein was impressed by that divine Spirit, a spiritual Resemblance of its own Goodness and Sanctity, besides other Attributes. For, though there are some in them not only uncommunicated, but absolutely inimitable and unshadowable by any Excellency in Man's Soul, as Immenfity, Infiniteness, Omnipotence, Omniscience, &c. yet I understand that whatsoever eminent Perfections the Power and Bounty of God conferred upon Man's Soul, are all of them so many Shadows and faint Representations of his Perfections.

The Properties then, wherein the Image consists, are three; and the first is Spirituality; and this may be proved, First, From its Manner of Working, which is immaterial, by considering Objects

jects as universal, and purified from the Grossness of Matter. Secondly, From its Independance on the Body, in that Manner of Working, which it useth only by Way of Deliverance and Conveyance, not of Assistance to elicit an immediate Act. *Phantasmata sunt Objecta, non Instrumenta Operationis.* As Light doth not at all concur to the Act of Seeing, which soly flows from the vital Power; but only serves as an extrinsical Assistant. Another Reason may be the Difference between material and immaterial Powers; because bodily Faculties are offended with the too great Excellency of the Object; But the Understanding is Comforted with the highest Contemplations. And again, *Habet Animus Argumentum sue Divinitatis* (saith Seneca) *quod illum Divina delectant.*

The Second is, Simplicity, which follows the Form. For where there is Matter, there is Composition. I exclude not, from the Soul, all Manner of Composition; for it is proper only to God to be absolutely and perfectly Simple; but I exclude all essential Composition.

Aristot.
de Anima.
lib. 3. c. 6.

The Third follows from these; and that is, that it is immortal; *Interitus*

Hooker
lib. 5. § 2.
p. 188,
189. Du
Plessis
c. 15. De
Veritat.
Relig.

est Secretio, &c. Now then, where there is no Union, there is no Separation, and by Consequence, no Death. Again, *Nulla Gens adeo extra Leges est projecta, ut non aliquos Deos credat,* (saith Seneca) which cannot but be raised out of a secret Hope, that either in this Life, or another, their Piety should be rewarded. Again, from the Nature of the Object, we may easily rise to know the Nature, both of the Faculty, and of the Essence. Where therefore, no mortal Object bears full Convenience, nor is able to satiate and quiet the Faculty there, and the Essence, whence it flows, are both immortal. The sensitive Parts find full Satisfaction in this Life; only the Reasonable, the Understanding, and Will, can never be replenished in their Mortality. Every Man is an Alexander, tho' not in Conquests, yet in Empires. This World is too strait and empty; only the Sight and Possession of God can satiate our Understandings and Wills; both which aim *ad Summum*; That *ad summam Causam*; to the first of Truths; this *ad summum Bonum*, to the last of Ends. And therefore he, which is first and last, can satisfie these two searching and unquiet Faculties. All our Knowledge we

we heap up here, serves only as a Mirrour to view our Ignorance in ; and we have only Light enough to discover that we are in the Dark. *Hoc est quod palles?* Or do we toil and sweat for that, which we sooner forsake than find? Is it natural for the Gaining of Knowledge to hasten unto That, whereby we lose both that and our selves? And labour for a Purchase, which like Lightning is at once begun and ended ; yea, sooner lost than gotten. Certainly were not Man conscious of his own Immortality, could he have a strong and evident Perswasion of his final Corruption (or Annihilation) there could be no stronger Inducement to Sottishness, Riot, and all other sensual and unbridled Practices.

Other Reasons, vid. Aristotle. And others are taken from the Causes of Corruption, which is wrought either by Contraries, Defect of the Cause, or Defect of the Subject : None whereof can be verified of the Soul. Aristot. 3.
de Anima.

Other Attributes there are more accidental to God, to which it beareth a Resemblance, (though a dark One.) And the first of them is his Power. For these two great Parts of his Workmanship, his Creation and Redemption,

demption, are Incommunicates appropriated unto Him. Yet in many other Proceedings of God's Works, there is some Analogy in the Works of Men. For, First, in the making and swaying of the World, there was Nothing properly created but the Chaos, and out of the Obedience thereof, the Power did educe and extract those Forms of Heaven and Earth: So Man also in his Works of Art doth *ex Potentia obedientiali*, of any proposed Masse, produce, *Non per Naturam, sed Imperium*, Forms of Art full of Decency and Beauty. The Second is Beauty, of which there is a Resemblance in Man; for altho' the Fall hath so darkned his Eyes, as to make him walk in a Maze, without Method and Disposition; yet certain it is, that in the Mind of Man, there still remains a Pilot, still a Light of Nature, some Glimpses of Reason, whereby our Actions may be directed unto their true Ends. Another, is Knowledge, which doubtless was after an eminent Manner infused into the Heart of Man, when he was able, by the Intuition of the Creatures, to give unto them all, Names, according to their several Natures; and in them to shew Himself as well a Philosopher,

losopher, as a Lord : And tho' by his
 Fall he robbed himself of this, as well
 as of all other most excellent Degrees
 of his Perfection, yet still Man, by his
 Nature, is a curious and enquiring
 Creature, winding it self into all the
 Passages of Nature, and continually
 turning over that World of Knowledge.
 There are two main Desires in each
 Creature ; one of Perfection ; the other,
 of Perpetuity. This Aristotle attributes
 more especially to each Creature living,
 which by generating *sibi simile*, doth
 revenge it self on the Law of Cor-
 ruption : And that Immortality, which
 they can not retain in their Individuals,
 they procure by deriving their contin-
 ual Nature to a continued Offspring.
 But in Man (tho' in Respect of his
 Life, the other is as well true) that
 other Desire of Perfection is more ve-
 rified. First, Because of his own Im-
 mortality, he needs not so much the
 other ; and then, because Knowledge,
 the Perfection of Man, is to him, as I
 may so speak, a new Generation of
 him, being of sufficient Power to ex-
 empt the Person indued therewith,
 from all Period or Resolution of Time,
 and to make him survive his Morta-
 lity.

Another

Another Attribute is his Holiness, which though through our Fall it be quite taken from us, yet still here is the *Opus operatum*; tho' the Ignorance of the true End take away the Sanctity of it, the Top of Nature yet reacheth unto that of Grace; we have in us the Testimonies, though not the Goodness of our first Estate; the Ruins of a Temple to be lamented, though not the holy Places to be inhabited.

Now it follows to speak of these Parts of Man's Soul, his Understanding and his Will.

Concerning the Understanding, tho' the Dignity of it may consist in the Latitude of its Objects, yet principally in its Operations, both *ad extra* in respect of the Objects; and *ad intra*, in respect of the Will. Those which respect the Objects, are either passive or active Operations. Passive, are either the first Apprehensions of the Soul, by the Administration and Ministry of the Sense, or else, Discourse; of all which the principal Dignity consists in the End, to wit, Knowledge. The Excellency whereof, being before handled, I proceed to their most obvious and useful Corruptions, which are either,

ther, Opinion or Error, the One doubtful, the Other peremptory.

The Causes of Opinion are two; First, Disproportion between the Understanding and the Object. When the Object either is too bright and excellent or too dark, the One dazzles the Power, the Other affects it not; the One like *Lumen* and *Vespertilionem*; the other, like a Mist, to perplex the Eye. The Object of the Understanding must have a double Temper; it must have some Abstraction in it, and some Materiality; Abstraction, in Respect of the Spirituality of the Understanding; and Materiality, in Respect of the Sense, on which, as on the Medium, the Understanding depends.

The next Cause may be, Acuteness and Subtlety of Wit, when Men out of an Ability, like Carneades, to discourse probably on either Side, are forced to make Choice of Something else to aver, or else to float, and be equally ineluctable to either Part; which tho' it be in it self a Defect of Learning, yet is both commendable and useful; because it takes away all Suspicion of Heresy, and lessens the Number of them, gives more Occasion

Plin. Ex
Diversi-
tate ratio-
num, &c.

of inquiring into the Truth; and, to conclude, argues Modesty; (unless in Divinity, and then it is Infidelity) which will not suffer it self to be captivated by its own Conceits, or by those Reasons, in which it self is able to descry Weakness.

The other was Error; whereby I understand a peremptory and habitual Assent fixed on some Falsehood. And this is so much the more dangerous, by how much the nearer it comes to true Knowledge. For, as that hath a commanding Power over the Understanding, so hath Heresy, whereby it possesseth the Mind with an irresistible Credulity. The main Cause of this, is Sin; but there are others more immediate. As first, In the Abuse of Principles; if the Root and Fountain be bitter, the Branches and Streams have their Corruptions also. And this is done either by abusing and perverting them in their own Conceits, which is *Error Illationis*; or by transferring them, or other Sciences, and then it is *Error Dependens*. The Former Plato us'd, when he inveighing against Oratory, was then most of all an Orator; making a Sword of Eloquence to wound it self. Men never more

more wrong Knowledge, than when they promise to clear it most; nor do they so much build upon Truth, as hide in it; nor make it their Foundation, but their Cloke. By Reason of the later, so many of the ancient Philosophers denied those two main Doctrines of the Creation and Resurrection; whilst Religion, which should subdue and captivate the Understanding, is made to stoop and bow unto Reason; and whilst those Assents, which should be grounded on Faith, and not Discourse, are admitted according to the Conformity they have with Nature, and no further. Thus as Men, which see through a coloured Glass, have all Objects, how different soever represented under the same Colour; so they, which examine all Conclusions by forestalled Principles for that Purpose, think every Thing, of whatsoever Nature, to be died under the Colour of their Conceits, which can not but be very prejudicial unto Knowledge; and Error easily thereby creeps in.

Another Cause may be the Affectation of Singularity; when Men shall desire rather to walk in Mazes, than in beaten Paths; to be guilty of their own invented Errors, than content with a

Like Scipio entering the Capitol. Liv. 26. lib. 6.

Hooker lib. 1. § 16. p. 49.

Hooker lib. 3. § 7.

derived and imputed Learning, and had rather be accounted the Purchasers of an Heresy, than the Heirs of Truth; the Authors of Tyranny, than the Successors of lawful Government. He that will always peremptorily be his own Scholar, hath very seldom a wise Man to his Master,

Another Cause is a too credulous and prejudicial Opinion of Authority; when we bow our Judgments not so much to the Nature of Things, as to the Learning of Men, and *credere, quam scire reverentius*. It is indeed a Wrong to Authors to read them always with Scepticism; and to doubt of every Thing, is to get Resolution in Nothing. But yet our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with Reservation; there must not be a vile Captivating and Resignation of the Judgment into another Man's Hand. Belief without Evidence of Reason, must be only there absolute, where the Authority is unquestionable, and where it is Impiety to err, there only it is impious to distrust. As for Men's Assertions, *Quibus plerumque potest subesse falsum*, what he said of Friendship is more warrantable in Knowledge, *Sic crede, tanquam dissensurus*. It is too much imposing on Man's Understanding

ing, to subdue and intire it unto any;
 and to esteem the Dissent from some
 particular Authorities, as Presumption
 or Self-conceit: Nor indeed was there
 any Thing which bred more Distem-
 pers in the Body of Learning, than Fa-
 ctions and Sidings; when, as Seneca
 said of Cato, he would rather esteem
 Drunkenness a Virtue, than Cato Vi-
 cious. For Peripatetick, and Platonist,
 and Scotist, and Thomist, &c. and O-
 thers of those learned Idolaters, shall
 rather count Error Truth, than their
 great Masters: erroneous. But yet, not
 as if I left every Man to the unbri-
 dled Rashness of his own Head; or to a
 presumptuous Dependence on his own
 Judgment, with Contempt and Neglect
 of Others. But I consider a double
 Estate of Learning, Inchoation and Pro-
 gress. In this later, there are required
 a discerning Judgment, and some Li-
 berty of Dissent; yet for the other,
 Aristotle's Saying is true, *Oportet discen-
 tem credere*; for as in the Generation of
 a Man, he first receives Nutrimment from
 the Womb, afterward from his Nurse,
 afterward hath the Freedom of his own
 Choice or Dislike, so in the Generation
 of Knowledge, the first Knitting of Joints
 and Members of it into one Body, is
 best

Vid. Hook
 lib. 1. § 6.
 what he
 saith of
 Aristotle.

best effected by the Authority and Learning of some one Brain; but being grown unto some Stature, not to give it the Liberty of its own Judgment, were to confine it still to its Cradle. 'Tis true, indeed, that Aristotle, and all those worthy Founders of Learning do well deserve some Credit, as well to their Authority, as to their Matter; and to have more Sway over our Assents, than an ordinary Witness over a Judge, by his Evidence. But yet there is a Difference between Reverence and Superstition: We may assent unto them as Ancients, but not as Oracles. As I will not distrust all, that without manifest Truth they deliver, so likewise will I suspend my Belief; and where I find Reason peremptory, I will rather speak Truth with my Mistress Nature, than maintain an Heresy with my Master Aristotle. As there may be Friendship, so there may be Honour with Diversity of Opinions; and there never yet was a Divorce between Reverence and Dissent, *Plura saepe peccantur, dum demeremur, quam dum offendimus.* We dishonour our Ancestors more by reverencing them, than by opposing them in their Errors. Our Opinion is foul, if we think that they had

had rather have us Followers of them,
than of the Truth. (See Hooker, lib.
2. § 7. p. 74. & Aristot. Ethic. lib. 6.
c. 11.)

Another Cause of Error may be a ^{Quod nimis volumus, facile credimus.}
Fastening too peremptory an Affection
on some particular Objects; as if Truth
were the Handmaid to our Passions,
or Chamæleon like could alter it self
to the Temper of our Desires, *Vitia
nostra, quia amamus, defendimus.* Thus,
as it is usual with Men of deceitful
Palates, in Sicknes, to conceive every
Thing they taste, of some disagreeing
Savour; so these Minds prepossessed
with some particular Fancy, (*Inus ex-
istens prohibet alienum*) they can see No-
thing in its proper Colours.

Another Reason is, Curiosity. It is
the Vanity of Man, as well in Know-
ledge, as in any Thing else, to esteem
that, which is far fetched and dear
bought, most precious; as if Danger and
Rarity, were the only Things of Worth:
And Ignorance is so opposite to Man's
Nature, that tho' it be holy, it pleaseth
not. He which thinks he may know
every Thing, wants this one Know-
ledge, that he must be ignorant of
some Things.

The

The Actions of the Understanding are seen in Invention, Wit, Judgment. Of Invention, there are two Parts, the Discovering the Truth, and the Tradition of it. But this is seen in Contemplation; and therefore now, of its Corruptions. And the first is, a distrustful Diffidence of our own Ability; when as to all ill affected Bodies, every light Weakness is more felt, than any violent Distemper, where the Constitution is stronger: So with such fearful Wits, every Inquiry is estimated, not according to the Nature of the Object, *sed ex Debilitate nostra, non calcant Spinis, sed habent*, like * Plutarch's Woman's Darknes.

Seneca.

Another Cause is, That too much Reverence of Antiquity; whilst among thriftless Persons, who are negligent of repairing their Estate, *Divitiarum Abundantia in Causis Paupertatis est*: So these, when they only rest in the Legacies our Ancestors left, and never improve their own Inventions, they only purchase a large Measure of Ignorance in those Inquiries.

Tusc. qu.
1. 2.

The last is, Immaturity: Learning is a Tree, which spreadeth it self into

* Seneca says this of Harpasse his own Nurse.

many Branches, & *difficile ergo est pau-
ca ei esse nota, cui non sint omnia, aut
pleraque.*

The other Part, is, Tradition; which
consists, either in Speech, Writing or
Eloquence.

There was not, I persuade my self,
amongst the Ancients, a greater Mean
of Truth, than the Freedom of their
own Opinions. For notwithstanding
that this Liberty was often Times the
Occasion of many prodigious Births, yet
this Disadvantage was countervailed
with many godly and fruitful Issues, all
which would have been undiscovered,
had Men laboured only in Conditions,
and bridled their Understandings from
farther Inquiry.

Again, less prejudicial it is to Learn-
ing, to have many Errors (which, I con-
fess, naturally follows this Self-Liberty,
with Freedom of Dissent) than fewer,
with a Kind of necessary Subscription,
which follows the inthralling of our
Inventions unto the Wits of others. Be-
sides, even of those very Errors, I make
no Question, but there hath been great
Use made, by those great Inquirers into
Truth. For First, There are very few
Errors that have not some Way or o-
ther

ther annexed to them, which happily might never have been observed, had not Freedom of Opinion vented those Errors. It is an Error in that Man, that shall presume of a Treasure hid in his Land, to dig and turn it up to no other End, but to find his imaginary Gold, yet the stirring and softening the Ground, is a Mean to make it more fertil. Lastly, This Use hath those Errors in Inquiry after Truth, that they let us know what is not; and it is speedier to come to a positive Conclusion by a negative Knowledge, than a bare Ignorance; as he is sooner likely to find out a Place, who knoweth which is not the Way, than he which barely knoweth not the Way.

The last Prejudice or Cause of Disability in the Inventions may be Immaturity and Unfurniture, for Want of acquainting a Man's Self with the Body of Learning; for Learning is a Tree or Body, which, in one continued Substance, brancheth it self into sundry Members; so that there is not only in the Objects of the Will, which are the Good of Things, but in the Objects of the Understanding, also, which
are

are the Trunk, a certain Unity, and mutual Concatenation, whereby every Part hath some Reference to another: Insomuch, that in the handling of particular Sciences, there be often such Occurrences as do necessarily require an Insight into other Sorts of Learning. So that, That of Tully is generally true, *Difficile est pauca ei nota esse, cui non sint aut pleraque, aut omnia*; all that address themselves, either to the Inventions of Arts not known, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their Endeavours on the Experiments of Knowledge in sundry Kinds of Learning.

As for that other Part of Invention, which I call Tradition, Communication, or Diffusion, I comprehend it with in that one Perfection peculiar to Man from all other Creatures, viz. Oration, or Speech; wherein I consider a double ministerial Reference, the one to the Eye, the other to the Ear; that is, *Vox scripta*, a visible Voice; this, *vox Viva*, a speaking Voice. To which purpose Scaliger speaks acutely; *Est quidem Recitator, Liber loquens; Liber, Recitator mutus*. The Dignities, which this particular confers on Man, and

wherein it gives him a Pre-eminence above all the Creatures, are taken from the End of the Offices thereof, for the Worth of a ministerial Instrument is to be gathered from the Regularity of its Function, whereunto it is naturally instituted. Now there are Offices peculiar unto the forenamed Branches, and there are, which are common unto both.

Aristot.
Politic.
lib. 1. c. 2.

The End, whereunto living and original Speech was principally ordained, is, to maintain mutual Society among Men incorporated into one Body. And therefore Tully will call it *Humane Societatis Vinculum*, the Ligament and Sinew, whereby the Body of human Conversation is compacted and knit into One; so then, tho' it be true which Aristotle hath observed, That Man is, out of his own natural Propension, *Animal Politicum*, a sociable and conversing Creature, yet that Man to whom Nature hath denied this one Band, by which he should be serviceably united unto the other Body, is nothing but an unfinewed Part, a Member out of Joint, whereby he is made a double Monster; a Monster in the Defect of his own Nature, wanting,

next

next to his Soul, his principal Perfection; and a Monster in Regard of his Unserviceableness to that civil Society, wherein by Nature he is incorporated.

The principal and main Corruption of this Speech, in Regard of uniting the Minds of Men together (which only Dignity I observe in it alone) was that Punishment inflicted by God on the Babel-Rebels, Confusion of Tongues, whereby human Society being before that Time, by Reason of the Unity of Language, more collected into one, was loosed and unjointed, and a more notable Division made amongst them; and indeed, (if we observe it) as all Blessings Divine consist in Union and Peace; (for if Man had continued in his State of Innocency, he should have enjoyed a constant and settled Union with God, with his own Heart, and with the rest of his Society) so, on the contrary Side, the Rebellions and exorbitant Practices of Men have been ever by God punished with Separation and Division; Separation first from Him, by denying us the Fruition of his Favours; Separation next from our selves by Death; Separation, lastly from one another,

another, as in many other Circumstances according to the Nature of some other Crimes; so in this more especially, the Confusion of Tongues, it being at once both a Punishment and a Disappointment of that impious Attempt. Concerning the other Part of Tradition, which is by Writing, I shall not much insist upon any Dignity peculiar to it, in Respect of Man; because it is not any intrinsical Part of his Worth, but only an artificial Instrument of spreading or deriving the Concoits of his Mind, farther than that former of Speech can do; wherein consist the principal Dignities thereof, in Spreading, I say, and Diffusion of our Notions farther, both in a larger Latitude, in Respect of the Time present, and in a deeper Succession, in Respect of the Time to come. For this double Prerogative hath Writings above Words, that they speak farther than our Mouths can do, while we live; and that they out-live us too, and derive themselves upon Posterity.

Aristot. de
Interpret.
p. 1.

Of the Perfections common both to Speech and Writing, the first and principal

cipal is, to be the Interpreters of the
 Cogitations; to reveal and communi-
 cate the Conceits of the Mind, for the
 Good, either of the Hearers or Readers,
 with this Difference, that Words im-
 mediately represent Conceits, and
 Writing, Words. So that Words are
 nothing else but audible Notions; and
 Writing, visible Words. Man being
 by Nature a conversing and discoursing
 Creature, and yet not able to repre-
 sent his Conceits immediately to the
 Apprehension of another (it being the
 Privilege of God only to read the
 Heart) stands therefore in Need of an
 instrumental Conveyance, by the Mi-
 nistry whereof he may discover any
 Thoughts, which, for any Cause, he
 desires to communicate unto others;
 and that is Speech; reaching it self
 (as I said) to the Ear, by natural
 Organs; or to the Eye, by artificial
 Furtherance. So that there is in the
 Apprehension and Discovery of any
 Notion, the same Manner of Repre-
 sentation, which is observable in Glasses
 and other reflecting Bodies. For a
 Glass receiving the Sun's Brightness
 can reflect it upon another Glass, and
 the

the same upon another, and so multiply the same Image; *usque adeo a speculo speculi trahitur Imago*; so likewise the Mind receiveth first by Sense, or with Discourse, the Species of some Object, whence a Conceit being framed, conveys it self upon the Speech, and that in some Cases, upon the Paper, and yet still it is the same Thing that is represented by all these.

There are sundry Corruptions of these two, both in Nature, from the Indisposition of Organs, in Negligence, from the Rudeness of Education, and in Morality, by abusing them in expressing any vicious Conceits; as many ill Thoughts, as the Heart can mould in it self, (and those are infinite) so many Ways is it possible for Speeches to be depraved. I shall therefore leave so endless a Search, and fasten on that, which I conceive to be the greatest of all other, and that principally. For as every Thing is then most regular, when it retains the Purity of its first Office and Institution; so on the other Side it is most depraved, when it becomes unnatural, and diverts it self from that Service, whereunto it was prin-

principally ordained. Thus a Picture, tho' it be never so much in the Frame abused, cracked, spotted, or any other Way made unvaluable, yet if the Resemblance, which it bears towards him, whom it represents, be express and lively, you still call it a true Picture; whereas, if that be a false and deceitful Resemblance, be all other Adventions and Ornaments never so exquisite, we still account it false and corrupt: So it is with the Speech of Man, which tho' of never so great Weakness and Insufficiency, or different from the Account of the Perfections, either of Nature, Art, or Honesty, (for those are the three chief Means of Dignity in the Speech) working pleasing Delivery for the Ear, plausible Language for the Fancy, profitable Invention for the Judgment; yet, if it retain that one Property of sharpening it self to the Conceits of the Mind, and making level and proportionable the Words with the Thought, it may be still said to be, tho' not a good, yet a regular and right Speech, in that it is conformable to the first Institution: But be all other Excellency never so Good, and beyond ordinary Perfection, yet if it be a false

U

Image

Image of our Inventions, if it turn once to Diffolution and Disappointments, Nature is diverted from her prime End, and the Faculty quite depraved, as forsaking the original Office it should exercise in communicating the secret and retired Motions of the Mind.

LAUS DEO. *Amen.*

A N

A N

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